System Hardening Chronicles: In Search of a Configuration Resilient to Targeted Attacks

        

#!/usr/sbin/nft -f

flush ruleset

table inet filter {
  
  # = Main chain policy =
  chain input {
    type filter hook input priority 0;
    policy drop;

    # = Set of general rules =
    # 🌀 Allow loopback interface (internal processes)
    iif "lo" accept

    # == 🔁 Allow established and related connections ==
    ct state established,related accept
    
    # == 🔒 Limit new connections per source IP (anti-DDoS) ==
    # == 🔒 Limit the rate of NEW connections per source IP (basic anti-DDoS protection) ==
    #    If you experience issues with slow or failed page loads in your browser,
    #    try increasing the limit, for example:
    #    ip saddr 0.0.0.0/0 ct state new limit rate 50/second burst 100 packets accept
    ip saddr 0.0.0.0/0 ct state new limit rate 25/second burst 50 packets accept
    ip saddr 0.0.0.0/0 ct state new log prefix "🔥 BAN: too many conn " flags all
    ip saddr 0.0.0.0/0 ct state new drop

    # == 🛡️ Rate-limit ICMP echo requests (ping) ==
    ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request limit rate 1/second accept
    ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request log prefix "🔥 BAN: ICMP flood " flags all
    ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request drop

    # == 🚫 Block SSDP and mDNS (local broadcast protocols) ==
    ip daddr 239.255.255.250 udp dport 1900 drop   # ❌ SSDP (UPnP/device discovery)
    ip daddr 224.0.0.251 udp dport 5353 drop       # ❌ mDNS (Bonjour, Avahi)

    # == 🛑 Block NetBIOS and LLMNR (internal Windows/systemd protocols) ==
    udp dport 137 drop    # ❌ NetBIOS Name Service (Windows network names)
    udp dport 138 drop    # ❌ NetBIOS Datagram Service (LAN browsing)
    udp dport 5355 drop   # ❌ LLMNR (Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution)

    # = Set of rules for blocking IP addresses and ranges =
    
    # == 🧱 Block known botnets and proxies ==
    ip saddr {
      45.9.20.0/24,
      89.248.160.0/19,
      185.220.100.0/22,
      198.96.155.0/24,
      185.107.56.0/24,
      185.129.62.0/23
    } log prefix "🔥 BAN: known bots " flags all
    ip saddr {
      45.9.20.0/24,
      89.248.160.0/19,
      185.220.100.0/22,
      198.96.155.0/24,
      185.107.56.0/24,
      185.129.62.0/23
    } drop

    # == 🚫 Block invalid TCP flags (XMAS, NULL scan, etc.) ==
    tcp flags & (fin|syn|rst|psh|ack|urg) == 0 drop        # NULL scan
    tcp flags & (fin|psh|urg) == (fin|psh|urg) drop          # XMAS scan
    tcp flags & (fin|syn) == (fin|syn) drop                  # SYN-ACK scan
    tcp flags & (syn|rst|fin) == (syn|rst|fin) drop          # Xmas scan
    tcp flags & (syn|fin|rst|psh|ack) == (syn|rst|fin|ack) drop # Xmas scan

    # == 🚫 Block fragmented packets — often used to bypass filters ==
    ip frag-off & 0x1fff != 0 drop

    # == 🔒 Block packets with spoofed IPs (anti-spoofing) ==
    ip saddr 127.0.0.0/8 drop          # localhost
    ip saddr 10.0.0.0/8 drop           # private network
    ip saddr 172.16.0.0/12 drop        # private network
    ip saddr 192.168.0.0/16 drop       # private network
    ip saddr 169.254.0.0/16 drop       # APIPA
    ip saddr 0.0.0.0/8 drop            # invalid address
    ip saddr 224.0.0.0/4 drop          # multicast
    ip saddr 240.0.0.0/5 drop          # reserved
  }

  # = Main chain policy =
  chain forward {
    type filter hook forward priority 0;
    policy accept;
    
    #  = Various attack restrictions =
    # Only needed in chain forward if you have Docker or Oracle VirtualBox.
    # Uncomment if needed.

    #  == 🔒 Limit new connections per source IP (anti-DDoS) ==
    # ip saddr 0.0.0.0/0 ct state new limit rate 25/second burst 50 packets accept
    # ip saddr 0.0.0.0/0 ct state new log prefix "🔥 BAN: too many conn " flags all
    # ip saddr 0.0.0.0/0 ct state new drop

    # == 🛡️ Rate-limit ICMP echo requests (ping) ==
    # ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request limit rate 1/second accept
    # ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request log prefix "🔥 BAN: ICMP flood " flags all
    # ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request drop

    # = Allow necessary TCP/UDP ports and ranges =

    # == Allow TCP ports required for applications ==
    tcp dport {
      53,         # DNS — needed for domain name resolution
      80,         # HTTP — web traffic, downloading updates and resources
      443,        # HTTPS — secure web traffic, VPN, browser
      12043,      # Custom 3D application — specific client port
      13000-13050 # Custom 3D application — dynamic client port range
    } accept
    

    # == Allow UDP ports required for applications ==
    udp dport {
      53,         # DNS — needed for domain name resolution
      443,        # HTTPS over QUIC/HTTP3, browser protocols
      3478,       # STUN/TURN — WebRTC and video conferencing
      3479-3481   # STUN/TURN — WebRTC and video conferencing
    } accept

    # = Block potentially dangerous and unnecessary TCP/UDP ports and ranges =
    
    # These restrictions are designed for a DESKTOP / workstation.
    # They block remote access, outdated services, proxies, databases, IoT, and ports
    # that are frequently used by malware, scanners, and C2 infrastructure.
    #
    # ⚠ If you are using the system as a SERVER, enable IP forwarding,
    # or run services with their own routing
    # (Docker NAT/bridge, VirtualBox host-only/bridged, VPN clients),
    # be sure to review the list of blocked ports and ranges in the forward chain —
    # these services may require additional ports.
    # If necessary, adjust or comment out the required ports and ranges.

    # == Block various suspicious TCP ports ==
    tcp dport {
    # === Remote access (high risk) ===
      22,     # SSH — brute-force target
      23,     # Telnet — outdated, no encryption
      3389,   # RDP — Windows remote access
      5900,   # VNC — remote access, frequent vulnerability
    # === FTP / SMB / NetBIOS (dangerous file-sharing services) ===
      21,     # FTP — insecure protocol
      137,    # NetBIOS Name Service
      138,    # NetBIOS Datagram
      139,    # NetBIOS Session
      445,    # SMB/CIFS — frequent exploit target
    # === Databases (NEVER open to the internet) ===
      3306,   # MySQL/MariaDB
      1433,   # MS SQL Server
      1434,   # MS SQL Browser
    # === HTTP-alt/Proxy/Elasticsearch (dangerous, frequently attacked) ===
      8080,   # HTTP proxy / web interfaces — often open test interfaces
      9200,   # Elasticsearch API — full remote data access
    # === UPnP/IoT (inherently vulnerable by design) ===
      1900,   # SSDP / UPnP
    # === Frequently used by malware (RAT, C2, reverse shells) ===
      4444,   # Metasploit reverse shell
      5555,   # Android ADB / IoT botnets
      9001,   # Tor transport (frequently used by malware)
      1234,   # Netcat / reverse connections
      1337,   # Frequent C2 infrastructure port for malware
    #  === ⚠️ Ports for scanners and potentially vulnerable services === 
      1080,   # SOCKS proxy — often used by attackers to bypass filters
      3128,   # Squid HTTP proxy — can be used as a proxy/to bypass blocks
      8000,   # Alternative HTTP ports, web services — potentially vulnerable
      8888,   # Alternative web interfaces — test and proxy ports
      10000   # Webmin — web admin panel, attack target
    } drop

    # == Block various suspicious UDP ports ==
    udp dport {
      161,    # SNMP — network monitoring; can be used by attackers
      162     # SNMP Trap — similarly, potential vulnerability
    } drop

    # Attention! When blocking wide port ranges, be careful!
    # Do not harm the operation of the system and applications!
    
    # == TCP port ranges not used by workstations during transit routing ==
    # Blocked to prevent unwanted traffic forwarding, hidden tunnels,
    # NAT bypass, parasitic connections, and potential attacks through the forward path.

    tcp dport {
      1024-2047,    # System and outdated services; almost never needed in forward
      2048-4095,    # Proprietary and rare daemons; NFS (2049) — check if you use it
      4096-8191,    # Old VPNs, some games, P2P; rarely needed on a desktop
      8192-12287,   # Alternative HTTP/proxy, multimedia; test
      12288-16383,  # Media data/VoIP (TCP fallback); may break calls
      16384-24575,  # RTP/WebRTC (TCP fallback); block if audio/video not needed
      24576-32767,  # Dynamic ranges for games/VPN; possible side effects
      32768-49151,  # Main registered/ephemeral ports; dangerous, can break NAT, Docker, VM
      49152-65535   # High ephemeral; actively used by modern applications
    } drop


    # == 🚫 Block UDP ports — high and dynamic ranges ==
    udp dport {
      1024-9999,     # Low and medium ephemeral ports, rarely used by system services,
                     # can be used by Trojans, P2P, games, VPNs
      10000-32767,   # Potentially dangerous ports for outbound connections
                     # We block them because they are not used by the kernel for ephemeral ports
                     # P2P clients, games, and malware may be hiding here
      32768-60999,   # Standard Linux ephemeral ports
                     # CAUTION! These ports are needed for normal operation:
                     # - Docker containers (downloading updates)
                     # - DNS queries (often use high ports)
                     # - APT and other package managers
                     # - Normal network operation
      61000-65535    # Upper reserved range
                     # Usually not used by standard applications
                     # We block to prevent non-standard outbound connections
    } drop


    # = 🕷️ Suspicious IPs — large ranges frequently used by botnets,
    # spam networks, and scanners =
    ip saddr {
      185.0.0.0/8,   # Abused hosting and proxy networks
      37.0.0.0/8,    # Cheap VPS, scanning sources
      88.0.0.0/8,    # Frequent brute-force and scanners
      77.0.0.0/8,    # Mass TOR/proxy nodes
      91.0.0.0/8     # Botnets and "gray" hosting
    } drop
  }

  chain output {
    # = Main chain policy =
    type filter hook output priority 0;
    policy accept;

    #  = Various attack restrictions =

    # == 🔒 Limit new connections per source IP (anti-DDoS) ==
    ip saddr 0.0.0.0/0 ct state new limit rate 25/second burst 50 packets accept
    ip saddr 0.0.0.0/0 ct state new log prefix "🔥 BAN: too many conn " flags all
    ip saddr 0.0.0.0/0 ct state new drop


    # = ICMP protocol restrictions =
    
    # == 🛡️ Rate-limit ICMP echo requests (ping) ==
    ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request limit rate 1/second accept
    ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request log prefix "🔥 BAN: ICMP flood " flags all
    ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request drop
    
    # == Critically important ICMP for the network ==
    ip protocol icmp icmp type { destination-unreachable, time-exceeded, parameter-problem } accept

    # == Important ICMPv6 for IPv6 ==
    ip6 nexthdr icmpv6 icmpv6 type { 1, 2, 3, 4 } accept
    ip6 nexthdr icmpv6 icmpv6 type { 135, 136 } accept  # NS/NA
    ip6 nexthdr icmpv6 icmpv6 type { 133, 134 } accept  # RS/RA

    # == Block all other ICMP and ICMPv6 ==
    ip protocol icmp drop           # all other ICMP drop
    ip6 nexthdr icmpv6 drop         # all other ICMPv6 drop

    
    # = Block SCTP protocol =
    # 99.9% of desktop systems don't use SCTP at all
    meta l4proto sctp drop
    
    
    # = Block DCCP — Datagram Congestion Control Protocol =
    # Not used by any mainstream desktop application
    meta l4proto dccp drop
    
    
    # = Allow necessary TCP/UDP ports and ranges =

    # == Allow TCP ports and ranges required for applications ==
    tcp dport {
    53,     # DNS client — Required for internet: domain name resolution (UDP/TCP).
    80,     # HTTP — Traffic to websites without encryption; applications may access APIs/redirects.
    443,    # HTTPS — Main port for all encrypted web traffic — browser, API, VPN, updates.
    3306,   # MySQL client — Needed if connecting to MySQL
    3478,   # STUN/TURN WebRTC — Needed for audio/video/Discord
    3000,   # Node.js dev servers — Needed during development
    3690,   # SVN — If working with an old repository
    4443,   # Alternative HTTPS (some APIs) — Sometimes used by VPN/clients
    12043,  # Required for custom 3D application
    13000-13050   # Required for custom 3D application
    } accept
    
  
    # == Allow UDP ports and ranges required for applications ==
    udp dport {
    443,    # Needed for fast and stable operation of modern websites 
            # (Google, YouTube, ChatGPT, Cloudflare)
    13000-13050   # Required for custom 3D application
    } accept 

    # = Block potentially dangerous and unnecessary TCP/UDP ports and ranges =
    
    # These restrictions are designed for a DESKTOP / workstation.
    # ⚠ If you are using the system as a SERVER -
    # adjust or comment out the required ports and ranges as needed.

    # == Block various suspicious TCP ports ==
    tcp dport {
    # === Remote access (high risk) ===
      22,     # SSH — brute-force target
      23,     # Telnet — outdated, no encryption
      3389,   # RDP — Windows remote access
      5900,   # VNC — remote access, frequent vulnerability
    # === FTP / SMB / NetBIOS (dangerous file-sharing services) ===
      21,     # FTP — insecure protocol
      137,    # NetBIOS Name Service
      138,    # NetBIOS Datagram
      139,    # NetBIOS Session
      445,    # SMB/CIFS — frequent exploit target
    # === Databases (NEVER open to the internet) ===
      3306,   # MySQL/MariaDB
      1433,   # MS SQL Server
      1434,   # MS SQL Browser
    # === HTTP-alt/Proxy/Elasticsearch (dangerous, frequently attacked) ===
      8080,   # HTTP proxy / web interfaces — often open test interfaces
      9200,   # Elasticsearch API — full remote data access
    # === UPnP/IoT (inherently vulnerable by design) ===
      1900,   # SSDP / UPnP
    # === Frequently used by malware (RAT, C2, reverse shells) ===
      4444,   # Metasploit reverse shell
      5555,   # Android ADB / IoT botnets
      9001,   # Tor transport (frequently used by malware)
      1234,   # Netcat / reverse connections
      1337,   # Frequent C2 infrastructure port for malware
    #  === ⚠️ Ports for scanners and potentially vulnerable services === 
      1080,   # SOCKS proxy — often used by attackers to bypass filters
      3128,   # Squid HTTP proxy — can be used as a proxy/to bypass blocks
      8000,   # Alternative HTTP ports, web services — potentially vulnerable
      8888,   # Alternative web interfaces — test and proxy ports
      10000   # Webmin — web admin panel, attack target
    } drop

    # == Block various suspicious UDP ports ==
    udp dport {
      161,    # SNMP — network monitoring; can be used by attackers
      162     # SNMP Trap — similarly, potential vulnerability
    } drop


    # Attention! ⚠️ When blocking wide port ranges, be careful! ⚠️ 
    # Do not harm the operation of the system and applications!
    # If you need a specific range, uncomment the line with it.
    # If not needed, comment it out.


    #  == Block "dangerous" and critically unnecessary TCP port ranges for desktops ==
    tcp dport {
      1-1023,	    # 🛑 Privileged ports
      1024-2047,	# r-commands (rlogin, rsh, rexec), old RPC, NFS, outdated daemons
      2048-3071,    # Rare proprietary protocols and middleware
      3072-4999,    # Mostly outdated, server and enterprise application ports;
                    # Almost never needed on regular workstations            
      5000-5999,    # Alternative services, old P2P/administration, rarely needed on desktop
      7000-7999,    # Alternative services, test ports, often used by Trojans
      9000-9999,    # Web services, proxies, possible backdoor ports
      10000-19998,  # Dynamic and high service ports; may be used by applications like Firestorm,
                    # but not needed by most desktop services          
      19999-32767   # Old ephemeral port range; actively used by P2P,
                    # games, some VPNs, but system services rarely touch them       
    } drop


    #  == Block "dangerous" and critically unnecessary UDP port ranges for desktops ==
    udp dport {
      1024-2047,    # Old UNIX services, RPC, NFS, r-commands, outdated daemons
                    # Usually safe to block
      2048-4095,    # Rarely used standard ports, proprietary services
                    # Also usually safe to block
    #  4096-8191,    # VPN, games, P2P, WebRTC, VoIP for some clients
                    # Can be blocked, but be careful: may affect VPN/applications
      8192-12287,   # QUIC/HTTP3, proxy, multimedia protocols
                    # Possible side effects, better to test
      12288-16383,  # Old RTP/VoIP ranges and media streams
                    # Can be blocked, but may break video calls
      16384-24575,  # Main RTP range (audio/video), WebRTC, VoIP
                    # ❗ Do NOT block if you need video calls/WebRTC/VPN
      24576-32767   # Dynamic ports for VPN, P2P, games, streaming data
                    # ❗ May break VPN and some applications
    } drop

    # == 🕷️ Block suspicious IPs — large ranges frequently used by botnets,
    # spam networks, and scanners ==
    ip saddr {
      185.0.0.0/8,  # Abused hosting and proxy networks
      37.0.0.0/8,   # Cheap VPS, scanning sources
      88.0.0.0/8,   # Frequent brute-force and scanners
      77.0.0.0/8,   # Mass TOR/proxy nodes
      91.0.0.0/8    # Botnets and "gray" hosting
    } drop
  }
}


        
    

        
	
	
# ============================================
# SYSTEM HARDENING CONFIG (Debian 13 / MATE)
# Version: 6.0 (final)
# Date: 2026-03-03 16:31
# ============================================
# Apply: sudo sysctl --system
# ============================================

# ========== CORE NETWORK ==========

net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_all = 1
net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1
net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0
net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = 1
net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians = 1
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0
net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 = 1
net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter = 1
net.ipv4.conf.default.arp_filter = 1
net.ipv4.tcp_rmem = 4096 87380 4194304
net.ipv4.tcp_wmem = 4096 65536 4194304
net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 = 1
net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 = 1
net.ipv4.tcp_synack_retries = 2

# ========== NETWORK HARDENING ==========

net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 1
net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = 1
net.ipv4.conf.*.rp_filter = 1
net.ipv4.tcp_fin_timeout = 15
net.ipv4.tcp_tw_reuse = 1
net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = 1

# ========== KERNEL HARDENING ==========

kernel.dmesg_restrict = 1
kernel.kptr_restrict = 2
kernel.randomize_va_space = 2
kernel.yama.ptrace_scope = 1
dev.tty.ldisc_autoload = 0
fs.protected_fifos = 2
kernel.sysrq = 0
net.core.bpf_jit_harden = 2
kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled = 1

# ========== END OF CONFIG ==========

        
# Retrieved: 22.06.2026
# Command used: for file in ~/.local/share/flatpak/overrides/*; do echo "=== $file ==="; cat "$file"; echo; done

=== /home/user/.local/share/flatpak/overrides/com.viber.Viber ===
[Context]
sockets=!x11

=== /home/user/.local/share/flatpak/overrides/io.gitlab.librewolf-community ===
[Context]
shared=!ipc
sockets=!cups;!pcsc;!fallback-x11
features=per-app-dev-shm
filesystems=/home/user/Videos;/home/user/Pictures;/home/user/Music;/home/user/Downloads;/home/user/Documents;/home/user/Desktop

[Session Bus Policy]
org.a11y.Bus=none

=== /home/user/.local/share/flatpak/overrides/org.geany.Geany ===
[Context]
shared=!ipc;!network
sockets=!fallback-x11;!x11
filesystems=/home/user/Desktop/команды и настройки/Социнженерия/Прочие публикации;!host

=== /home/user/.local/share/flatpak/overrides/org.keepassxc.KeePassXC ===
[Context]
shared=!ipc;!network
sockets=!pcsc;!ssh-auth;!x11
filesystems=/home/user/Desktop/команды и настройки/Коды и пароли;!host
        
    

        
	
# ============================================
# OPENSNITCH USER RULES
# Creation date: 2026-04-03 — 2026-04-08
# ============================================

# ========== BROWSERS (allowed) ==========

# LibreWolf
{
  "name": "allow-librewolf",
  "action": "allow",
  "duration": "always",
  "operator": {
    "operand": "process.path",
    "data": "/app/lib/librewolf/librewolf"
  }
}

# Firefox ESR
{
  "name": "allow-firefox-esr",
  "action": "allow",
  "duration": "always",
  "operator": {
    "operand": "process.path",
    "data": "/usr/lib/firefox-esr/firefox-esr"
  }
}

# ========== APPLICATIONS (allowed) ==========

# Python interpreter (for scripts)
{
  "name": "allow-python3.13",
  "action": "allow",
  "duration": "always",
  "operator": {
    "operand": "process.path",
    "data": "/usr/bin/python3.13"
  }
}

# Git (GitHub access)
{
  "name": "allow-git-remote-http",
  "action": "allow",
  "duration": "always",
  "operator": {
    "operand": "process.path",
    "data": "/usr/lib/git-core/git-remote-http"
  }
}

# Systemd NTP client (time synchronization)
{
  "name": "allow-systemd-timesyncd",
  "action": "allow",
  "duration": "always",
  "operator": {
    "operand": "process.path",
    "data": "/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-timesyncd"
  }
}

# APT (package updates)
{
  "name": "allow-apt-http-method",
  "action": "allow",
  "duration": "always",
  "operator": {
    "operand": "process.path",
    "data": "/usr/lib/apt/methods/http"
  }
}

# NetworkManager (main network manager)
{
  "name": "allow-networkmanager",
  "action": "allow",
  "duration": "always",
  "operator": {
    "operand": "process.path",
    "data": "/usr/sbin/NetworkManager"
  }
}

# Kernel connection (VPN services)
{
  "name": "allow-kernel-connection",
  "action": "allow",
  "duration": "always",
  "operator": {
    "operand": "process.path",
    "data": "Kernel connection"
  }
}

# Client for updating firmware (fwupdmgr)
{
  "name": "allow-fwupdmgr",
  "action": "allow",
  "duration": "always",
  "operator": {
    "operand": "process.path",
    "data": "/usr/bin/fwupdmgr"
  }
}

# ========== BLOCKED APPLICATIONS ==========

# Ruby interpreter (suspicious activity)
{
  "name": "deny-ruby3.3",
  "action": "deny",
  "duration": "always",
  "operator": {
    "operand": "process.path",
    "data": "/usr/bin/ruby3.3"
  }
}

# DNS utility dig (risk)
{
  "name": "deny-dig",
  "action": "deny",
  "duration": "always",
  "operator": {
    "operand": "process.path",
    "data": "/usr/bin/dig"
  }
}

# GNOME Software (not needed)
{
  "name": "deny-gnome-software",
  "action": "deny",
  "duration": "always",
  "operator": {
    "operand": "process.path",
    "data": "/usr/bin/gnome-software"
  }
}

# Scanner daemon (not needed)
{
  "name": "deny-colord-sane",
  "action": "deny",
  "duration": "always",
  "operator": {
    "operand": "process.path",
    "data": "/usr/libexec/colord-sane"
  }
}

# Printer service (not needed)
{
  "name": "deny-gsd-print-notifications",
  "action": "deny",
  "duration": "always",
  "operator": {
    "operand": "process.path",
    "data": "/usr/libexec/gsd-print-notifications"
  }
}

# LibreOffice (internet access denied)
{
  "name": "deny-libreoffice-soffice",
  "action": "deny",
  "duration": "always",
  "operator": {
    "operand": "process.path",
    "data": "/usr/lib/libreoffice/program/soffice.bin"
  }
}

# WebKitNetworkProcess (GNOME rendering engine)
{
  "name": "deny-webkit-network-process",
  "action": "deny",
  "duration": "always",
  "operator": {
    "operand": "process.path",
    "data": "/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/webkitgtk-6.0/WebKitNetworkProcess"
  }
}

# Email server (not needed)
{
  "name": "deny-exim4",
  "action": "deny",
  "duration": "always",
  "operator": {
    "operand": "process.path",
    "data": "/usr/sbin/exim4"
  }
}

        
# Obtain IP addresses for a domain
dig +short wiki.debian.org
        
    

        
proxy-ca-01.debian.org.
209.87.16.81
        
    

        

#!/usr/sbin/nft -f

flush ruleset

table inet filter { # Opening the ruleset

  
  # ============================================
  # START OF INPUT CHAIN
  # ============================================
  
  # = Main chain policy =
  chain input {
    type filter hook input priority 0;
    policy drop;

    # = Set of general rules =
    # 🌀 Allow loopback interface (internal processes)
    iif "lo" accept

    # == 🔁 Allow established and related connections ==
    ct state established,related accept
    
    # == 🔒 Limit new connections per source IP (anti-DDoS) ==
    ip saddr 0.0.0.0/0 ct state new limit rate 25/second burst 50 packets accept
    ip saddr 0.0.0.0/0 ct state new log prefix "🔥 BAN: too many conn " flags all
    ip saddr 0.0.0.0/0 ct state new drop

    # == 🛡️ Limit pings ==
    ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request limit rate 1/second accept
    ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request log prefix "🔥 BAN: ICMP flood " flags all
    ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request drop

    # == 🚫 Block SSDP and mDNS (local broadcast protocols) ==
    ip daddr 239.255.255.250 udp dport 1900 drop   # ❌ SSDP (UPnP/device discovery)
    ip daddr 224.0.0.251 udp dport 5353 drop       # ❌ mDNS (Bonjour, Avahi)

    # == 🛑 Block NetBIOS and LLMNR (internal Windows/systemd protocols) ==
    udp dport 137 drop    # ❌ NetBIOS Name Service (Windows network names)
    udp dport 138 drop    # ❌ NetBIOS Datagram Service (LAN recognition)
    udp dport 5355 drop   # ❌ LLMNR (Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution)

    # = Set of rules for blocking IP addresses and ranges =
    
    # == 🧱 Block known botnets and proxies ==
    ip saddr {
      45.9.20.0/24,
      89.248.160.0/19,
      185.220.100.0/22,
      198.96.155.0/24,
      185.107.56.0/24,
      185.129.62.0/23
    } log prefix "🔥 BAN: known bots " flags all
    ip saddr {
      45.9.20.0/24,
      89.248.160.0/19,
      185.220.100.0/22,
      198.96.155.0/24,
      185.107.56.0/24,
      185.129.62.0/23
    } drop

    # == 🚫 Block invalid TCP flags (XMAS, NULL scan, etc.) ==
    tcp flags & (fin|syn|rst|psh|ack|urg) == 0 drop        # NULL scan
    tcp flags & (fin|psh|urg) == (fin|psh|urg) drop          # XMAS scan
    tcp flags & (fin|syn) == (fin|syn) drop                  # SYN-ACK scan
    tcp flags & (syn|rst|fin) == (syn|rst|fin) drop          # Xmas scan
    tcp flags & (syn|fin|rst|psh|ack) == (syn|rst|fin|ack) drop # Xmas scan

    # == 🚫 Block fragmented packets — often used to bypass filters ==
    ip frag-off & 0x1fff != 0 drop

    # == 🔒 Block packets with spoofed IPs ==
    ip saddr 127.0.0.0/8 drop          # localhost
    ip saddr 10.0.0.0/8 drop           # private network
    ip saddr 172.16.0.0/12 drop        # private network
    ip saddr 192.168.0.0/16 drop       # private network
    ip saddr 169.254.0.0/16 drop       # APIPA
    ip saddr 0.0.0.0/8 drop            # invalid address
    ip saddr 224.0.0.0/4 drop          # multicast
    ip saddr 240.0.0.0/5 drop          # reserved
  }

  # ============================================
  # END OF INPUT CHAIN
  # ============================================


  # ============================================
  # START OF FORWARD CHAIN
  # ============================================

  # = Main chain policy =
  chain forward {
    type filter hook forward priority 0;
    policy accept;
    
    #  = Various attack restrictions =
    # Only needed in the forward chain if you have Docker, Oracle VirtualBox.
    # Uncomment if needed.

    #  == 🔒 Limit new connections per source IP (anti-DDoS) ==
    # ip saddr 0.0.0.0/0 ct state new limit rate 25/second burst 50 packets accept
    # ip saddr 0.0.0.0/0 ct state new log prefix "🔥 BAN: too many conn " flags all
    # ip saddr 0.0.0.0/0 ct state new drop

    # == 🛡️ Limit pings ==
    # ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request limit rate 1/second accept
    # ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request log prefix "🔥 BAN: ICMP flood " flags all
    # ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request drop

    # = Allow necessary TCP/UDP ports and ranges =

    # == Allow TCP ports required for applications ==
    tcp dport {
      53,         # DNS — needed for domain name resolution
      80,         # HTTP — web traffic, downloading updates and resources
      443,        # HTTPS — secure web traffic, VPN, browser
      873,        # Needed for rsync (OpenVAS updates, if rsync goes through Docker)
      12043,      # Firestorm Viewer — specific client port
      13000-13050 # Firestorm Viewer — dynamic client port range
    } accept
    
    # Required in the forward chain for proper operation of the OpenVAS web interface
    tcp dport 9392 accept
    

    # == Allow UDP ports required for applications ==
    udp dport {
      53,         # DNS — needed for domain name resolution
      443,        # HTTPS over QUIC/HTTP3, browser protocols
      3478,       # STUN/TURN — WebRTC and video conferencing
      3479-3481   # STUN/TURN — WebRTC and video conferencing
    } accept

    # = Block potentially dangerous and unnecessary TCP/UDP ports and ranges =
    
    # These restrictions are designed for a DESKTOP / workstation.
    # They block remote access, outdated services, proxies, databases, IoT, and ports
    # that are frequently used by malware, scanners, and C2 infrastructure.
    #
    # ⚠ If you are using the system as a SERVER, enable IP forwarding,
    # or run services with their own routing
    # (Docker NAT/bridge, VirtualBox host-only/bridged, VPN clients),
    # be sure to review the list of blocked ports and ranges in the forward chain —
    # these services may require additional ports.
    # If necessary, adjust or comment out the required ports and ranges.

    # == Block various suspicious TCP ports ==
    tcp dport {
    # === Remote access (high risk) ===
      22,     # SSH — brute-force target
      23,     # Telnet — outdated, no encryption
      3389,   # RDP — Windows remote access
      5900,   # VNC — remote access, frequent vulnerability
    # === FTP / SMB / NetBIOS (dangerous file-sharing services) ===
      21,     # FTP — insecure protocol
      137,    # NetBIOS Name Service
      138,    # NetBIOS Datagram
      139,    # NetBIOS Session
      445,    # SMB/CIFS — frequent exploit target
    # === Databases (NEVER open to the internet) ===
      3306,   # MySQL/MariaDB
      1433,   # MS SQL Server
      1434,   # MS SQL Browser
    # === HTTP-alt/Proxy/Elasticsearch (dangerous, frequently attacked) ===
      8080,   # HTTP proxy / web interfaces — often open test interfaces
      9200,   # Elasticsearch API — full remote data access
    # === UPnP/IoT (inherently vulnerable by design) ===
      1900,   # SSDP / UPnP
    # === Frequently used by malware (RAT, C2, reverse shells) ===
      4444,   # Metasploit reverse shell
      5555,   # Android ADB / IoT botnets
      9001,   # Tor transport (frequently used by malware)
      1234,   # Netcat / reverse connections
      1337,   # Frequent C2 infrastructure port for malware
    #  === ⚠️ Ports for scanners and potentially vulnerable services === 
      1080,   # SOCKS proxy — often used by attackers to bypass filters
      3128,   # Squid HTTP proxy — can be used as a proxy/to bypass blocks
      8000,   # Alternative HTTP ports, web services — potentially vulnerable
      8888,   # Alternative web interfaces — test and proxy ports
      10000   # Webmin — web admin panel, attack target
    } drop

    # == Block various suspicious UDP ports ==
    udp dport {
      161,    # SNMP — network monitoring; can be used by attackers
      162     # SNMP Trap — similarly, potential vulnerability
    } drop

    # Attention! When blocking wide port ranges, be careful!
    # Do not harm the operation of the system and applications!
    
    # == TCP port ranges not used by workstations during transit routing ==
    # Blocked to prevent unwanted traffic forwarding, hidden tunnels,
    # NAT bypass, parasitic connections, and potential attacks through the forward path.

    tcp dport {
      1024-2047,    # System and outdated services; almost never needed in forward
      2048-4095,    # Proprietary and rare daemons; NFS (2049) — check if you use it
      4096-8191,    # Old VPNs, some games, P2P; rarely needed on a desktop
      8192-12287,   # Alternative HTTP/proxy, multimedia; test
      12288-16383,  # Media data/VoIP (TCP fallback); may break calls
      16384-24575,  # RTP/WebRTC (TCP fallback); block if audio/video not needed
      24576-32767  # Dynamic ranges for games/VPN; possible side effects
      # 32768-49151,  # Main registered/ephemeral ports; dangerous, can break NAT, Docker, VM
      # 49152-65535   # High ephemeral; actively used by modern applications
    } drop


    # == 🚫 Block UDP ports — high and dynamic ranges ==
    udp dport {
      1024-9999,     # Low and medium ephemeral ports, rarely used by system services,
                     # can be used by Trojans, P2P, games, VPNs
      10000-32767,   # Potentially dangerous ports for outbound connections
                     # We block them because they are not used by the kernel for ephemeral ports
                     # P2P clients, games, and malware may be hiding here
      # 32768-60999,   # Standard Linux ephemeral ports
                     # CAUTION! These ports are needed for normal operation:
                     # - Docker containers (downloading updates)
                     # - DNS queries (often use high ports)
                     # - APT and other package managers
                     # - Normal network operation
      61000-65535    # Upper reserved range
                     # Usually not used by standard applications
                     # We block to prevent non-standard outbound connections
    } drop


    # = 🕷️ Suspicious IPs — large ranges frequently used by botnets,
    # spam networks, and scanners =
    ip saddr {
      185.0.0.0/8,   # Abused hosting and proxy networks
      37.0.0.0/8,    # Cheap VPS, scanning sources
      88.0.0.0/8,    # Frequent brute-force and scanners
      77.0.0.0/8,    # Mass TOR/proxy nodes
      91.0.0.0/8     # Botnets and "gray" hosting
    } drop
  }

  # ============================================
  # END OF FORWARD CHAIN
  # ============================================
  
  # ============================================
  # START OF OUTPUT CHAIN
  # ============================================

  chain output {
    # = Main chain policy =
    type filter hook output priority 0;
    policy drop;
    
    # = THE VERY FIRST - critically important rules =
    
    ct state established,related accept
    oif "lo" accept
    
    # =========================================================================
    # 3. DNS SERVICE (Strict binding only to Quad9 at IP 9.9.9.9)
    # =========================================================================
    # Any other DNS query to the provider or hacker servers will be dropped
    ip daddr 9.9.9.9 udp dport 53 ct state new accept
    ip daddr 9.9.9.9 tcp dport 53 ct state new accept

    
    # == Critically important ICMP for the network ==
    ip protocol icmp icmp type { destination-unreachable, time-exceeded, parameter-problem } accept

    # == Important ICMPv6 for IPv6 ==
    ip6 nexthdr icmpv6 icmpv6 type { 1, 2, 3, 4 } accept
    ip6 nexthdr icmpv6 icmpv6 type { 135, 136 } accept  # NS/NA
    ip6 nexthdr icmpv6 icmpv6 type { 133, 134 } accept  # RS/RA
    
    # =========================================================================
    # BLOCKING RARE PROTOCOLS
    # =========================================================================
    # All rare protocols (SCTP, DCCP, and others) are automatically blocked
    # by the policy drop. Explicit rules are not required for them.
    # =========================================================================
    
    
    # === Router web interface ===
    ip daddr 192.168.0.1 tcp dport 80 accept
    
    # === Cloudflare (global CDN and DDoS protection network) ===
    # Used by ChatGPT, DeepSeek, and many other services for
    # faster loading and attack protection. Main pool 104.16.0.0/12.
    ip daddr {
        104.16.0.0/12,        # Main Cloudflare pool (104.16.0.0 – 104.31.255.255)
        172.64.0.0/13,        # Additional Cloudflare pool
        162.158.0.0/15,       # European Cloudflare pool
        198.41.128.0/17       # American Cloudflare pool
    } tcp dport { 80, 443 } ct state new accept

    # === Fastly (content delivery network) ===
    # Used for loading static content, fonts, and scripts.
    ip daddr {
        151.101.0.0/16,       # Main Fastly pool
        199.232.0.0/16        # Additional Fastly pool
    } tcp dport { 80, 443 } ct state new accept

    # === Amazon CloudFront / AWS (cloud infrastructure) ===
    # Widely used for hosting APIs, backends, and CDN.
    ip daddr {
        13.32.0.0/15,         # CloudFront US East
        143.204.0.0/16,       # CloudFront EU
        54.239.128.0/18,      # CloudFront Asia Pacific
        13.224.0.0/14,        # CloudFront Edge (global)
        18.160.0.0/13,        # CloudFront Edge (additional)
        52.84.0.0/15,         # CloudFront authentication
        3.173.0.0/16,         # AWS Edge (general pool)
        23.211.0.0/16,        # AWS CloudFront (additional)
        23.47.0.0/16          # AWS CloudFront (backup)
    } tcp dport { 80, 443 } ct state new accept

    # === Google Cloud / YouTube (Google infrastructure, ASN 15169) ===
    ip daddr {
        64.233.160.0/19,      # Main Google pool (Search, Accounts)
        74.125.0.0/16,        # Google service pools, including Gmail and gstatic
        142.250.0.0/15,       # Largest subnet for YouTube and Gemini API
        172.217.0.0/16,       # Content delivery servers and googleusercontent
        173.194.0.0/16,       # Additional routes for Google Drive and authorization
        209.85.128.0/17,      # Regional Google Cloud/API data centers
        216.58.192.0/19,      # Old but active Google DNS and frontend pools
        35.190.0.0/16,        # Google Cloud (general pool)
        35.191.0.0/16         # Google Cloud (additional)
    } tcp dport { 80, 443 } ct state new accept

    # === GitHub (development platform) ===
    ip daddr {
        140.82.112.0/20,      # Main GitHub subnets
        192.30.252.0/22,      # Additional GitHub pools
        185.199.108.0/22      # CDN networks (raw.githubusercontent.com, githubassets.com)
    } tcp dport { 80, 443 } ct state new accept

    # === Debian Infrastructure (official servers and mirrors) ===
    ip daddr {
        130.89.148.0/24,      # Physical ftp.debian.org servers (Netherlands)
        128.31.0.0/16,        # Official Debian infrastructure networks (MIT/USA)
        149.20.4.0/24,        # Technological gateways for mirroring and forums
        206.12.19.0/24,       # SPI routing backup pools
        151.101.0.0/16,       # Fastly CDN for deb.debian.org
        199.232.0.0/16,       # Additional Fastly pool for security
        146.75.0.0/17         # Backup Debian package delivery routes
    } tcp dport { 80, 443 } ct state new accept
   
    # === openSUSE / Zeek (openSUSE infrastructure) ===
    ip daddr {
        195.135.220.0/22,     # Main openSUSE data center
        130.57.0.0/16         # Additional Novell/SUSE server pools
    } tcp dport { 80, 443 } ct state new accept

    # === LibreWolf (update repository) ===
    ip daddr {
        179.61.251.0/24,      # repo.librewolf.net server (Frantech/BuyVM)
        198.251.80.0/20,      # BuyVM range in Luxembourg/USA
        209.141.32.0/19       # Additional LibreWolf hosting routes
    } tcp dport 443 ct state new accept

    # === DeepSeek (specific IP addresses and subnets) ===
    # Identified based on analysis of your list.
    ip daddr {
        103.193.104.0/22,     # DeepSeek company's own technological routes
        154.8.0.0/16,         # Asian and global DeepSeek hosting pools
        159.69.48.177/32,     # Hetzner (Germany) - possible backend
        150.171.109.51/32,    # Possible backend or partner server
        43.109.10.32/27,      # Asian pool (range 43.109.10.32 - 43.109.10.63)
        38.54.123.48/32,      # Cogent Communications (possible route)
        95.101.61.198/32,     # Small range (Germany, possibly partner)
        95.101.61.209/32,
        95.101.61.218/32,
        111.170.168.113/32,   # Chinese provider (regional access)
        20.150.95.164/32,     # Microsoft Azure (possible backend)
        34.107.243.93/32      # Google Cloud (possible backend)
    } tcp dport { 80, 443 } ct state new accept

  } 
  
  # ============================================
  # END OF OUTPUT CHAIN
  # ============================================
  
} 

        
    

        
# Start analysis with logging to a file
sudo tcpdump -i enp0s7 -n "((tcp or udp) and (dst port 80 or dst port 443)) and not dst net 192.168.0.0/24" -v > /home/user/ai_traffic_raw.txt
        
    

        
# Remove duplicates from the file
grep -oE '[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}' /home/user/ai_traffic_raw.txt | sort -u > /home/user/ai_unique_ips.txt
        
    

        
# == 🔒 Limit new connections per source IP (anti-DDoS) ==
# == 🔒 Limit the rate of NEW connections per source IP (basic anti-DDoS protection) ==
#    If you experience issues with slow or failed page loads in your browser,
#    try increasing the limit, for example:
#    ip saddr 0.0.0.0/0 ct state new limit rate 50/second burst 100 packets accept
ip saddr 0.0.0.0/0 ct state new limit rate 25/second burst 50 packets accept
ip saddr 0.0.0.0/0 ct state new log prefix "🔥 BAN: too many conn " flags all
ip saddr 0.0.0.0/0 ct state new drop
        
    

        
# == 🔒 Proper protection against aggressive incoming traffic (anti-DDoS) ==
# We do NOT allow traffic, we only instantly destroy what exceeds the limit.
# If the rate exceeds 25 per second, the packet is logged and dropped right here.
# If the rate is within limits, the packet goes further down, where a reliable default DROP awaits it.
ip saddr 0.0.0.0/0 ct state new limit rate over 25/second burst 50 packets log prefix "🔥 BAN: too many conn " flags all drop
        
    

        
# ATTENTION: There is NO accept keyword here. This rule does NOT allow packets out to the internet.
# The "!" sign means: if the rate exceeds the limit, LOG and DROP the packet.
# If the rate is within limits, the packet silently passes below — to your IP whitelist.
# ATTENTION: meta l4proto { tcp, udp } and th dport cover both TCP and UDP (HTTP/3) with a single shield.
meta l4proto { tcp, udp } th dport { 80, 443 } ct state new limit rate over 20/second burst 40 packets log prefix "🔥 OUT_WEB_LIMIT_BURST: " drop
        
    

        
#!/usr/sbin/nft -f
# = modification 25 =
# 03.03.2026 19:52 Commented out the outbound UDP port restriction that was interfering with ProtonVPN
# 04.03.2026 19:53 Allowed necessary ports for Docker in the forward chain
# 21.06.2026 08:24 Implemented outbound connection filtering by IP address

flush ruleset

table inet filter { # Opening the ruleset
  
  # ============================================
  # START OF INPUT CHAIN
  # ============================================
  
  # = Main chain policy =
  chain input {
    type filter hook input priority 0;
    policy drop;

    # = Set of general rules =
    # 🌀 Allow loopback interface (internal processes)
    iif "lo" accept

    # == 🔁 Allow established and related connections ==
    ct state established,related accept
    
    # == 🔒 Proper protection against aggressive incoming traffic (anti-DDoS) ==
    # We do NOT allow traffic, we only instantly destroy what exceeds the limit.
    # If the rate exceeds 25 per second, the packet is logged and dropped right here.
    # If the rate is within limits, the packet goes further down, where a reliable default DROP awaits it.
    ip saddr 0.0.0.0/0 ct state new limit rate over 25/second burst 50 packets log prefix "🔥 BAN: too many conn " flags all drop

    # == 🛡️ Rate-limit ICMP echo requests (ping) ==
    ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request limit rate 1/second accept
    ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request log prefix "🔥 BAN: ICMP flood " flags all
    ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request drop

    # == 🚫 Block SSDP and mDNS (local broadcast protocols) ==
    ip daddr 239.255.255.250 udp dport 1900 drop   # ❌ SSDP (UPnP/device discovery)
    ip daddr 224.0.0.251 udp dport 5353 drop       # ❌ mDNS (Bonjour, Avahi)

    # == 🛑 Block NetBIOS and LLMNR (internal Windows/systemd protocols) ==
    udp dport 137 drop    # ❌ NetBIOS Name Service (Windows network names)
    udp dport 138 drop    # ❌ NetBIOS Datagram Service (LAN browsing)
    udp dport 5355 drop   # ❌ LLMNR (Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution)

    # = Set of rules for blocking IP addresses and ranges =
    
    # == 🧱 Block known botnets and proxies ==
    ip saddr {
      45.9.20.0/24,
      89.248.160.0/19,
      185.220.100.0/22,
      198.96.155.0/24,
      185.107.56.0/24,
      185.129.62.0/23
    } log prefix "🔥 BAN: known bots " flags all
    ip saddr {
      45.9.20.0/24,
      89.248.160.0/19,
      185.220.100.0/22,
      198.96.155.0/24,
      185.107.56.0/24,
      185.129.62.0/23
    } drop

    # == 🚫 Block invalid TCP flags (XMAS, NULL scan, etc.) ==
    tcp flags & (fin|syn|rst|psh|ack|urg) == 0 drop        # NULL scan
    tcp flags & (fin|psh|urg) == (fin|psh|urg) drop          # XMAS scan
    tcp flags & (fin|syn) == (fin|syn) drop                  # SYN-ACK scan
    tcp flags & (syn|rst|fin) == (syn|rst|fin) drop          # Xmas scan
    tcp flags & (syn|fin|rst|psh|ack) == (syn|rst|fin|ack) drop # Xmas scan

    # == 🚫 Block fragmented packets — often used to bypass filters ==
    ip frag-off & 0x1fff != 0 drop

    # == 🔒 Block packets with spoofed IPs (anti-spoofing) ==
    ip saddr 127.0.0.0/8 drop          # localhost
    ip saddr 10.0.0.0/8 drop           # private network
    ip saddr 172.16.0.0/12 drop        # private network
    ip saddr 192.168.0.0/16 drop       # private network
    ip saddr 169.254.0.0/16 drop       # APIPA
    ip saddr 0.0.0.0/8 drop            # invalid address
    ip saddr 224.0.0.0/4 drop          # multicast
    ip saddr 240.0.0.0/5 drop          # reserved
  }

  # ============================================
  # END OF INPUT CHAIN
  # ============================================


  # ============================================
  # START OF FORWARD CHAIN
  # ============================================

  # = Main chain policy =
  chain forward {
    type filter hook forward priority 0;
    policy accept;
    
    #  = Various attack restrictions =
    # Only needed in chain forward if you have Docker, Oracle VirtualBox.
    # Uncomment if needed.

    # == 🔒 Proper protection against aggressive incoming traffic (anti-DDoS) ==
    # We do NOT allow traffic, we only instantly destroy what exceeds the limit.
    # If the rate exceeds 25 per second, the packet is logged and dropped right here.
    # If the rate is within limits, the packet goes further down, where a reliable default DROP awaits it.
    ip saddr 0.0.0.0/0 ct state new limit rate over 25/second burst 50 packets log prefix "🔥 BAN: too many conn " flags all drop

    # == 🛡️ Rate-limit ICMP echo requests (ping) ==
    # ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request limit rate 1/second accept
    # ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request log prefix "🔥 BAN: ICMP flood " flags all
    # ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request drop

    # ⬇️ INSERT: Forward chain port rules
    # Blocked and allowed TCP/UDP ports and ranges
    
        include "/etc/nftables.d/forward-tcp-udp.nft"
        
    # ⬆️ END OF INSERT

  }

  # ============================================
  # END OF FORWARD CHAIN
  # ============================================
  
  # ============================================
  # START OF OUTPUT CHAIN
  # ============================================

  chain output {
    # = Main chain policy =
    type filter hook output priority 0;
    policy drop;
    
    # = THE VERY FIRST - critically important rules =
    
    ct state established,related accept
    oif "lo" accept

    # =======================================================================
    # 1. GENERAL PROTECTIVE SHIELD (Only rate limiting!)
    # =======================================================================
    
    # ATTENTION: There is NO accept keyword here. This rule does NOT allow packets out to the internet.
    # The "!" sign means: if the rate exceeds the limit, LOG and DROP the packet.
    # If the rate is within limits, the packet silently passes below — to your IP whitelist.
    # ATTENTION: meta l4proto { tcp, udp } and th dport cover both TCP and UDP (HTTP/3) with a single shield.
    meta l4proto { tcp, udp } th dport { 80, 443 } ct state new limit rate over 20/second burst 40 packets log prefix "🔥 OUT_WEB_LIMIT_BURST: " drop
    
    
    # =========================================================================
    # 3. DNS SERVICE (Strict binding only to Quad9 at IP 9.9.9.9)
    # =========================================================================
    # Any other DNS query to the provider or hacker servers will be dropped
    ip daddr 9.9.9.9 udp dport 53 ct state new accept
    ip daddr 9.9.9.9 tcp dport 53 ct state new accept

    
    # == Critically important ICMP for the network ==
    ip protocol icmp icmp type { destination-unreachable, time-exceeded, parameter-problem } accept

    # == Important ICMPv6 for IPv6 ==
    ip6 nexthdr icmpv6 icmpv6 type { 1, 2, 3, 4 } accept
    ip6 nexthdr icmpv6 icmpv6 type { 135, 136 } accept  # NS/NA
    ip6 nexthdr icmpv6 icmpv6 type { 133, 134 } accept  # RS/RA
    
    # =========================================================================
    # BLOCKING RARE PROTOCOLS
    # =========================================================================
    # All rare protocols (SCTP, DCCP, and others) are automatically blocked
    # by the policy drop. Explicit rules are not required for them.
    # =========================================================================
    
    
    # ⬇️ INSERT: whitelist.nft file contents are inserted here
    
        include "/etc/nftables.d/whitelist.nft"
        
    # ⬆️ END OF INSERT


  } #  The penultimate brace closes the ruleset of the output chain. Do not remove!
  
  # ============================================
  # END OF OUTPUT CHAIN
  # ============================================
  
} #  The last brace closes the entire configuration ruleset. Do not remove!
        
    

        
#!/usr/sbin/nft -f
# 03.03.2026 19:52 Commented out the outbound UDP port restriction that was interfering with ProtonVPN
# 04.03.2026 19:53 Allowed necessary ports for Docker in the forward chain
# 21.06.2026 08:24 Implemented outbound connection filtering by IP address
# 28.06.2026 21:53 Set a limit on the number of connections per second
# Added filtering of whitelisted IP access by user UID
# Added filtering of invalid packets in the output chain

flush ruleset

table inet filter { # Opening the ruleset
  
  # ============================================
  # START OF INPUT CHAIN
  # ============================================
  
  # = Main chain policy =
  chain input {
    type filter hook input priority 0;
    policy drop;

    # = Set of general rules =
    # 🌀 Allow loopback interface (internal processes)
    iif "lo" accept

    # == 🔁 Allow established and related connections ==
    ct state established,related accept
    
    # == 🔒 Proper protection against aggressive incoming traffic (anti-DDoS) ==
    # We do NOT allow traffic, we only instantly destroy what exceeds the limit.
    # If the rate exceeds 100 per second, the packet is logged and dropped right here.
    # If the rate is within limits, the packet goes further down, where a reliable default DROP awaits it.
    ip saddr 0.0.0.0/0 ct state new limit rate over 100/second burst 200 packets log prefix "🔥 BAN: too many conn " flags all drop

    # == 🛡️ Rate-limit ICMP echo requests (ping) ==
    ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request limit rate 1/second accept
    ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request log prefix "🔥 BAN: ICMP flood " flags all
    ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request drop

    # == 🚫 Block SSDP and mDNS (local broadcast protocols) ==
    ip daddr 239.255.255.250 udp dport 1900 drop   # ❌ SSDP (UPnP/device discovery)
    ip daddr 224.0.0.251 udp dport 5353 drop       # ❌ mDNS (Bonjour, Avahi)

    # == 🛑 Block NetBIOS and LLMNR (internal Windows/systemd protocols) ==
    udp dport 137 drop    # ❌ NetBIOS Name Service (Windows network names)
    udp dport 138 drop    # ❌ NetBIOS Datagram Service (LAN browsing)
    udp dport 5355 drop   # ❌ LLMNR (Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution)

    # = Set of rules for blocking IP addresses and ranges =
    
    # == 🧱 Block known botnets and proxies ==
    ip saddr {
      45.9.20.0/24,
      89.248.160.0/19,
      185.220.100.0/22,
      198.96.155.0/24,
      185.107.56.0/24,
      185.129.62.0/23
    } log prefix "🔥 BAN: known bots " flags all
    ip saddr {
      45.9.20.0/24,
      89.248.160.0/19,
      185.220.100.0/22,
      198.96.155.0/24,
      185.107.56.0/24,
      185.129.62.0/23
    } drop

    # == 🚫 Block invalid TCP flags (XMAS, NULL scan, etc.) ==
    tcp flags & (fin|syn|rst|psh|ack|urg) == 0 drop        # NULL scan
    tcp flags & (fin|psh|urg) == (fin|psh|urg) drop          # XMAS scan
    tcp flags & (fin|syn) == (fin|syn) drop                  # SYN-ACK scan
    tcp flags & (syn|rst|fin) == (syn|rst|fin) drop          # Xmas scan
    tcp flags & (syn|fin|rst|psh|ack) == (syn|rst|fin|ack) drop # Xmas scan

    # == 🚫 Block fragmented packets — often used to bypass filters ==
    ip frag-off & 0x1fff != 0 drop

    # == 🔒 Block packets with spoofed IPs (anti-spoofing) ==
    ip saddr 127.0.0.0/8 drop          # localhost
    ip saddr 10.0.0.0/8 drop           # private network
    ip saddr 172.16.0.0/12 drop        # private network
    ip saddr 192.168.0.0/16 drop       # private network
    ip saddr 169.254.0.0/16 drop       # APIPA
    ip saddr 0.0.0.0/8 drop            # invalid address
    ip saddr 224.0.0.0/4 drop          # multicast
    ip saddr 240.0.0.0/5 drop          # reserved
  }

  # ============================================
  # END OF INPUT CHAIN
  # ============================================


  # ============================================
  # START OF FORWARD CHAIN
  # ============================================

  # = Main chain policy =
  chain forward {
    type filter hook forward priority 0;
    policy accept;
    
    #  = Various attack restrictions =
    # Only needed in chain forward if you have Docker, Oracle VirtualBox.
    # Uncomment if needed.

    # == 🔒 Proper protection against aggressive incoming traffic (anti-DDoS) ==
    # We do NOT allow traffic, we only instantly destroy what exceeds the limit.
    # If the rate exceeds 100 per second, the packet is logged and dropped right here.
    # If the rate is within limits, the packet goes further down, where a reliable default DROP awaits it.
    ip saddr 0.0.0.0/0 ct state new limit rate over 100/second burst 200 packets log prefix "🔥 BAN: too many conn " flags all drop

    # == 🛡️ Rate-limit ICMP echo requests (ping) ==
    # ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request limit rate 1/second accept
    # ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request log prefix "🔥 BAN: ICMP flood " flags all
    # ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request drop

    # ⬇️ INSERT: Forward chain port rules
    # Blocked and allowed TCP/UDP ports and ranges
    
        include "/etc/nftables.d/forward-tcp-udp.nft"
        
    # ⬆️ END OF INSERT

  }

  # ============================================
  # END OF FORWARD CHAIN
  # ============================================
  
  # ============================================
  # START OF OUTPUT CHAIN
  # ============================================

  chain output {
    # = Main chain policy =
    type filter hook output priority 0;
    policy drop;
    
    # = THE VERY FIRST - critically important rules =
    
    ct state established,related accept
    oif "lo" accept

    # Drop any outgoing packets marked as invalid by conntrack
    # This ensures immediate destruction of invalid packets
    # before the remaining filtering rules are applied.
    ct state invalid log prefix "🔥 INVALID_OUT_PACKET: " drop
    
    # =========================================================================
    # 🔒 SMART INSPECTION OF ESTABLISHED SESSIONS (Protection against Connection Hijacking)
    # =========================================================================
    
    # Allow established sessions ONLY if the packets within them originate from You, Your Browser, APT, or Root.
    # System ghosts (nobody, daemon) are completely exiled from here.
    ct state established,related meta skuid { user, _flatpak, _apt, root, systemd-timesync } accept

    # ⬇️ INSTANT CUTOFF: If an unauthorized system process attempts to hijack your session
    ct state established,related log flags skuid prefix "🔥 HIJACK_ATTEMPT_DROP: " drop

    # =======================================================================
    # 1. GENERAL PROTECTIVE SHIELD (Only rate limiting!)
    # =======================================================================
    
    # ATTENTION: There is NO accept keyword here. This rule does NOT allow packets out to the internet.
    # The "!" sign means: if the rate exceeds the limit, LOG and DROP the packet.
    # If the rate is within limits, the packet silently passes below — to your IP whitelist.
    # ATTENTION: meta l4proto { tcp, udp } and th dport cover both TCP and UDP (HTTP/3) with a single shield.
    meta l4proto { tcp, udp } th dport { 80, 443 } ct state new limit rate over 100/second burst 200 packets log prefix "🔥 OUT_WEB_LIMIT_BURST: " drop
    
    
    # =========================================================================
    # 2. DNS SERVICE
    # Strict binding only to Quad9 at IP 9.9.9.9
    # Length control, user filtering, and backup servers
    # =========================================================================

    # 2.1. For UDP, allow only short requests (<=150 bytes) and strictly from trusted users
    ip daddr { 9.9.9.9, 31.43.43.243, 31.43.43.143 } udp dport 53 meta length <= 150 meta skuid { user, _apt, root } ct state new accept

    # 2.2. For TCP, no length limit (for heavy DNSSEC responses), but strictly check the user
    ip daddr { 9.9.9.9, 31.43.43.243, 31.43.43.143 } tcp dport 53 meta skuid { user, _apt, root, systemd-timesync } ct state new accept

    # 2.3. All other attempts by any unauthorized services (or long UDP) — log and destroy
    ip daddr { 9.9.9.9, 31.43.43.243, 31.43.43.143 } meta l4proto { tcp, udp } th dport 53 log flags skuid prefix "🔥 OUT_BLOCK_LEAK_DNS: " drop


    # == Critically important ICMP for the network ==
    ip protocol icmp icmp type { destination-unreachable, time-exceeded, parameter-problem } accept

    # == Important ICMPv6 for IPv6 ==
    ip6 nexthdr icmpv6 icmpv6 type { 1, 2, 3, 4 } accept
    ip6 nexthdr icmpv6 icmpv6 type { 135, 136 } accept  # NS/NA
    ip6 nexthdr icmpv6 icmpv6 type { 133, 134 } accept  # RS/RA
    
    # =========================================================================
    # BLOCKING RARE PROTOCOLS
    # =========================================================================
    # All rare protocols (SCTP, DCCP, and others) are automatically blocked
    # by the policy drop. Explicit rules are not required for them.
    # =========================================================================
    
    
    # ⬇️ INSERT: whitelist.nft file contents are inserted here
    
        include "/etc/nftables.d/whitelist.nft"
        
    # ⬆️ END OF INSERT


  } #  The penultimate brace closes the ruleset of the output chain. Do not remove!
  
  # ============================================
  # END OF OUTPUT CHAIN
  # ============================================
  
} #  The last brace closes the entire configuration ruleset. Do not remove!
        
    

        
# Real-time log monitoring (kernel only, filtered by 🔥)
sudo journalctl -f -k | grep --line-buffered "🔥"
        
    

        
# /etc/nftables.d/whitelist.nft
# Whitelist of IP addresses for outbound connections
# Also applies filtering by UID

# === Router web interface ===
ip daddr 192.168.0.1 tcp dport 80 meta skuid { user, _flatpak, root } ct state new accept

# =========================================================================
# === Internet service provider ===
# =========================================================================
# Provider's personal account and main website your.provider.net
# Defined using strict CIDR ranges of the autonomous system
# Opened for account top-up even during DNS failures and blocks
ip daddr {
    192.0.2.0/24,         # Location of the personal account web server
    198.51.100.0/24,      # Location of the information website
    192.0.2.0/19,         # Provider's main address pool
    198.51.100.0/20       # Subscriber routing pool
} tcp dport { 80, 443 } meta skuid { user, _flatpak, root } ct state new accept

# === Cloudflare (global CDN and DDoS protection network) ===
# Used by ChatGPT, DeepSeek, and many other services for
# faster loading and attack protection. Main pool 104.16.0.0/12.
ip daddr {
    104.16.0.0/12,        # Main Cloudflare pool (104.16.0.0 – 104.31.255.255)
    172.64.0.0/13,        # Additional Cloudflare pool
    162.158.0.0/15,       # European Cloudflare pool
    198.41.128.0/17       # American Cloudflare pool
} tcp dport { 80, 443 } meta skuid { user, _flatpak } ct state new accept

# === Fastly (content delivery network) ===
# Used for loading static content, fonts, and scripts.
ip daddr {
    151.101.0.0/16,       # Main Fastly pool
    199.232.0.0/16        # Additional Fastly pool
} tcp dport { 80, 443 } meta skuid { user, _flatpak } ct state new accept

# === Amazon CloudFront / AWS (cloud infrastructure) ===
# Widely used for hosting APIs, backends, and CDN.
ip daddr {
    13.32.0.0/15,         # CloudFront US East
    143.204.0.0/16,       # CloudFront EU
    54.239.128.0/18,      # CloudFront Asia Pacific
    13.224.0.0/14,        # CloudFront Edge (global)
    18.160.0.0/13,        # CloudFront Edge (additional)
    52.84.0.0/15,         # CloudFront authentication
    3.173.0.0/16,         # AWS Edge (general pool)
    23.211.0.0/16,        # AWS CloudFront (additional)
    23.47.0.0/16          # AWS CloudFront (backup)
} tcp dport { 80, 443 } meta skuid { user, _flatpak } ct state new accept

# === Amazon Web Services (AWS CloudFront / EC2) ===
ip daddr {
    3.0.0.0/8,
    54.0.0.0/8,
    52.0.0.0/8,
    18.66.233.0/24
 } tcp dport { 80, 443 } meta skuid { user, _flatpak } ct state new accept

# === Google Cloud / YouTube (Google infrastructure, ASN 15169) ===
ip daddr {
    64.233.160.0/19,      # Main Google pool (Search, Accounts)
    74.125.0.0/16,        # Google service pools, including Gmail and gstatic
    142.250.0.0/15,       # Largest subnet for YouTube and Gemini API
    172.217.0.0/16,       # Content delivery servers and googleusercontent
    173.194.0.0/16,       # Additional routes for Google Drive and authorization
    209.85.128.0/17,      # Regional Google Cloud/API data centers
    216.58.192.0/19,      # Old but active Google DNS and frontend pools
    35.190.0.0/16,        # Google Cloud (general pool)
    35.191.0.0/16         # Google Cloud (additional)
} tcp dport { 80, 443 } meta skuid { user, _flatpak } ct state new accept

# === Google (AS15169) - search, YouTube, Gmail, API ===
ip daddr {
    142.250.0.0/15,
    172.217.0.0/16,
    74.125.0.0/16 
} tcp dport { 80, 443 } meta skuid { user, _flatpak } ct state new accept

 # === Bing search engine and Microsoft services ===
 ip daddr {
    150.171.0.0/16,       # Main address pool of the Bing search engine
    40.126.0.0/18,        # Microsoft Live / Office authorization services
    20.190.128.0/18,      # Azure / Microsoft cloud backends
} tcp dport { 80, 443 } meta skuid { user, _flatpak } ct state new accept

# === GitHub (development platform) ===
ip daddr {
    140.82.112.0/20,      # Main GitHub subnets
    192.30.252.0/22,      # Additional GitHub pools
    185.199.108.0/22      # CDN networks (raw.githubusercontent.com, githubassets.com)
} tcp dport { 80, 443 } meta skuid { user, _flatpak } ct state new accept

# === Debian Infrastructure (official servers and mirrors) ===
ip daddr {
    130.89.148.0/24,      # Physical ftp.debian.org servers (Netherlands)
    128.31.0.0/16,        # Official Debian infrastructure networks (MIT/USA)
    149.20.4.0/24,        # Technological gateways for mirroring and forums
    206.12.19.0/24,       # SPI routing backup pools
    151.101.0.0/16,       # Fastly CDN for deb.debian.org
    199.232.0.0/16,       # Additional Fastly pool for security
    146.75.0.0/17,        # Backup Debian package delivery routes
    51.83.0.0/16          # Mirror repositories for deb.debian.org updates
} tcp dport { 80, 443 } meta skuid { user, _flatpak, _apt, root } ct state new accept

# === ⏰ Allow system time synchronization (NTP) ===
# This rule is paranoid: UDP port 123 is open EXCLUSIVELY for this process.
# No backdoor running as root or nobody will be able to exploit this loophole.
udp dport 123 meta skuid systemd-timesync ct state new accept

# === Debian Project & Wiki (By domain names in separate lines) ===
ip daddr {
	209.87.16.81 
} tcp dport { 80, 443 } meta skuid { user, _flatpak } ct state new accept

# === openSUSE / Zeek (openSUSE infrastructure) ===
ip daddr {
    195.135.220.0/22,     # Main openSUSE data center
    130.57.0.0/16         # Additional Novell/SUSE server pools
} tcp dport { 80, 443 } meta skuid { user, _apt, root } ct state new accept

# === LibreWolf (update repository) ===
ip daddr {
    179.61.251.0/24,      # repo.librewolf.net server (Frantech/BuyVM)
    198.251.80.0/20,      # BuyVM range in Luxembourg/USA
    209.141.32.0/19       # Additional LibreWolf hosting routes
} tcp dport 443 meta skuid { user, _apt, root } ct state new accept

# === DeepSeek (specific IP addresses and subnets) ===
# Identified based on analysis of your list.
ip daddr {
    103.193.104.0/22,     # DeepSeek company's own technological routes
    154.8.0.0/16,         # Asian and global DeepSeek hosting pools
    159.69.48.177/32,     # Hetzner (Germany) - possible backend
    150.171.109.51/32,    # Possible backend or partner server
    43.109.10.32/27,      # Asian pool (range 43.109.10.32 - 43.109.10.63)
    38.54.123.48/32,      # Cogent Communications (possible route)
    95.101.61.198/32,     # Small range (Germany, possibly partner)
    95.101.61.209/32,
    95.101.61.218/32,
    111.170.168.113/32,   # Chinese provider (regional access)
    20.150.95.164/32,     # Microsoft Azure (possible backend)
    34.107.243.93/32      # Google Cloud (possible backend)
} tcp dport { 80, 443 } meta skuid { user, _flatpak } ct state new accept

# === Wikipedia ===
ip daddr {
    185.15.59.224
} tcp dport { 443, 80 } meta skuid { user, _flatpak } ct state new accept

# === Facebook / Meta ===
ip daddr 57.144.0.0/14 tcp dport { 80, 443 } meta skuid { user, _flatpak } ct state new accept

# === Hetzner Cloud (if you use it) ===
ip daddr 150.171.0.0/16 tcp dport { 80, 443 } meta skuid { user, _flatpak } ct state new accept

# === Akamai (extended range 23.32.0.0/11) ===
ip daddr {
     23.32.0.0/11, 
     23.211.0.0/16, 
     23.64.0.0/16
} tcp dport { 80, 443 } meta skuid { user, _flatpak } ct state new accept

 # === Backup DNS Quad9 ===
 ip daddr  9.9.9.0/24 udp dport 53 meta skuid { user, _apt, root } accept

 # === Backup DNS Quad9 (149.112.0.0/16) ===
 ip daddr 149.112.0.0/16 udp dport 53 meta skuid { user, _apt, root } accept
        
    

        
# /etc/nftables.d/forward-tcp-udp.nft
# List of rules for the forward chain TCP UDP
# Status as of 26.06.2026 12:08

# = Allow necessary TCP/UDP ports and ranges =

# == Allow TCP ports required for applications ==
tcp dport {
  53,         # DNS — needed for domain name resolution
  80,         # HTTP — web traffic, downloading updates and resources
  443,        # HTTPS — secure web traffic, VPN, browser
  12043,      # Custom 3D application — specific client port
  13000-13050 # Custom 3D application — dynamic client port range
} accept

# == Allow UDP ports required for applications ==
udp dport {
  53,         # DNS — needed for domain name resolution
  443,        # HTTPS over QUIC/HTTP3, browser protocols
  3478,       # STUN/TURN — WebRTC and video conferencing
  3479-3481   # STUN/TURN — WebRTC and video conferencing
} accept

# = Block potentially dangerous and unnecessary TCP/UDP ports and ranges =

# These restrictions are designed for a DESKTOP / workstation.
# They block remote access, outdated services, proxies, databases, IoT, and ports
# that are frequently used by malware, scanners, and C2 infrastructure.
#
# ⚠ If you are using the system as a SERVER, enable IP forwarding,
# or run services with their own routing
# (Docker NAT/bridge, VirtualBox host-only/bridged, VPN clients),
# be sure to review the list of blocked ports and ranges in the forward chain —
# these services may require additional ports.
# If necessary, adjust or comment out the required ports and ranges.

# == Block various suspicious TCP ports ==
tcp dport {
# === Remote access (high risk) ===
  22,     # SSH — brute-force target
  23,     # Telnet — outdated, no encryption
  3389,   # RDP — Windows remote access
  5900,   # VNC — remote access, frequent vulnerability
# === FTP / SMB / NetBIOS (dangerous file-sharing services) ===
  21,     # FTP — insecure protocol
  137,    # NetBIOS Name Service
  138,    # NetBIOS Datagram
  139,    # NetBIOS Session
  445,    # SMB/CIFS — frequent exploit target
# === Databases (NEVER open to the internet) ===
  3306,   # MySQL/MariaDB
  1433,   # MS SQL Server
  1434,   # MS SQL Browser
# === HTTP-alt/Proxy/Elasticsearch (dangerous, frequently attacked) ===
  8080,   # HTTP proxy / web interfaces — often open test interfaces
  9200,   # Elasticsearch API — full remote data access
# === UPnP/IoT (inherently vulnerable by design) ===
  1900,   # SSDP / UPnP
# === Frequently used by malware (RAT, C2, reverse shells) ===
  4444,   # Metasploit reverse shell
  5555,   # Android ADB / IoT botnets
  9001,   # Tor transport (frequently used by malware)
  1234,   # Netcat / reverse connections
  1337,   # Frequent C2 infrastructure port for malware
#  === ⚠️ Ports for scanners and potentially vulnerable services === 
  1080,   # SOCKS proxy — often used by attackers to bypass filters
  3128,   # Squid HTTP proxy — can be used as a proxy/to bypass blocks
  8000,   # Alternative HTTP ports, web services — potentially vulnerable
  8888,   # Alternative web interfaces — test and proxy ports
  10000   # Webmin — web admin panel, attack target
} drop

# == Block various suspicious UDP ports ==
udp dport {
  161,    # SNMP — network monitoring; can be used by attackers
  162     # SNMP Trap — similarly, potential vulnerability
} drop

# Attention! When blocking wide port ranges, be careful!
# Do not harm the operation of the system and applications!

# == TCP port ranges not used by workstations during transit routing ==
# Blocked to prevent unwanted traffic forwarding, hidden tunnels,
# NAT bypass, parasitic connections, and potential attacks through the forward path.

tcp dport {
  1024-2047,    # System and outdated services; almost never needed in forward
  2048-4095,    # Proprietary and rare daemons; NFS (2049) — check if you use it
  4096-8191,    # Old VPNs, some games, P2P; rarely needed on a desktop
  8192-12287,   # Alternative HTTP/proxy, multimedia; test
  12288-16383,  # Media data/VoIP (TCP fallback); may break calls
  16384-24575,  # RTP/WebRTC (TCP fallback); block if audio/video not needed
  24576-32767,  # Dynamic ranges for games/VPN; possible side effects
  32768-49151,  # Main registered/ephemeral ports; dangerous, can break NAT, Docker, VM
  49152-65535   # High ephemeral; actively used by modern applications
} drop

# == 🚫 Block UDP ports — high and dynamic ranges ==
udp dport {
  1024-9999,     # Low and medium ephemeral ports, rarely used by system services,
                 # can be used by Trojans, P2P, games, VPNs
  10000-32767,   # Potentially dangerous ports for outbound connections
                 # We block them because they are not used by the kernel for ephemeral ports
                 # P2P clients, games, and malware may be hiding here
  32768-60999,   # Standard Linux ephemeral ports
                 # CAUTION! These ports are needed for normal operation:
                 # - Docker containers (downloading updates)
                 # - DNS queries (often use high ports)
                 # - APT and other package managers
                 # - Normal network operation
  61000-65535    # Upper reserved range
                 # Usually not used by standard applications
                 # We block to prevent non-standard outbound connections
} drop

# = 🕷️ Suspicious IPs — large ranges frequently used by botnets,
# spam networks, and scanners =
ip saddr {
  185.0.0.0/8,   # Abused hosting and proxy networks
  37.0.0.0/8,    # Cheap VPS, scanning sources
  88.0.0.0/8,    # Frequent brute-force and scanners
  77.0.0.0/8,    # Mass TOR/proxy nodes
  91.0.0.0/8     # Botnets and "gray" hosting
} drop
        
    

        
    
# ============================================
# SYSTEM HARDENING CONFIG
# Debian 13 (Trixie) / MATE
# Version: v. 7.0 blackcat568
# Date: 04.03.2026 16:31
# ============================================
# ATTENTION: Apply with: sudo sysctl --system
# After applying, reboot the system to verify stability.
# ============================================

# ========== CORE NETWORK RULES ==========

# 1. Complete ICMP Echo (ping) ignore - INCOMING REQUESTS ONLY
# Effect: The system does not respond to incoming ping requests. Makes your PC "invisible"
#         to simple network scanners and automated bots.
# Important: This does NOT block outgoing ping requests from your system.
#
# Side effects:
#   - Other hosts on the network will not be able to check your PC's availability via ping.
#   - Some VPNs and tunnels may use ICMP for keepalive (rare).
#
# Suitable for:
#   ✅ Home/office PC not providing public services — completely safe.
#   ❌ Public server — comment this line out. In this case, item 16 
#      (icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses) will only filter out erroneous ICMP packets.
#
# Note: Since IPv6 is disabled (item 11), this rule only applies to ICMPv4.
net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_all = 1

# 2. Ignore ICMP broadcast requests
# Effect: Protection against Smurf attacks (traffic amplification via broadcast requests).
# Side effects: None for a typical PC.
net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1

# 3. Enable SYN Cookies
# Effect: Protection against SYN flood attacks (DoS). When the SYN queue overflows, it enables cookie mechanism instead of dropping connections.
# Side effects: Slight increase in load during an attack. May affect some high-load servers, but safe for desktops.
net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1

# 4. Disable Source Routing
# Effect: Prevents attackers from specifying packet routes through your system (spoofing protection).
# Side effects: None for regular users.
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0

# 5. Log "martian" packets
# Effect: Logs packets with impossible (obviously forged) source/destination addresses.
# Side effects: May fill logs (journalctl) during network attacks or misconfiguration.
net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = 1
net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians = 1

# 6. Disable ICMP redirects
# Effect: Prevents routing table modification via ICMP packets. Protection against man-in-the-middle attacks.
# Side effects: In complex networks with dynamic routing may require enabling, but safe for stationary PCs.
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0

# 7. Disable packet forwarding
# Effect: System does not act as a router (does not forward packets between interfaces).
# Side effects: None (default value).
net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0

# 8. Protection against empty TCP window attacks
# Effect: Enables RFC 1337 - protection against attacks using "empty" TCP segments to hold connections.
# Side effects: None.
net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 = 1

# 9. ARP request filtering
# Effect: Protects against ARP spoofing by forcing the kernel to filter ARP replies from multiple interfaces.
# Side effects: May cause issues in complex load-balanced networks (requires configuration).
net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter = 1
net.ipv4.conf.default.arp_filter = 1

# 10. TCP window limits
# Effect: Sets minimum, default, and maximum receive/send buffer sizes.
# Side effects: Too low values may reduce download speed, but the specified values are optimal.
net.ipv4.tcp_rmem = 4096 87380 4194304
net.ipv4.tcp_wmem = 4096 65536 4194304

# 11. COMPLETE IPv6 DISABLE
# Effect: Disables entire IPv6 stack. Eliminates a whole class of IPv6-related vulnerabilities.
# ⚠️ RED MARK ⚠️
# Side effects: Applications requiring IPv6 stop working (some torrents, Docker containers, some sites via IPv6).
# Note: If using Docker or modern browsers with IPv6 preferences, localhost issues may occur.
net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 = 1
net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 = 1

# 12. Reduce SYN-ACK retry attempts
# Effect: Speeds up closing of "half-open" connections during attacks.
# Side effects: Under poor connectivity, some legitimate connections may terminate faster.
net.ipv4.tcp_synack_retries = 2

# ========== NETWORK HARDENING ==========

# 13. Disable sending ICMP redirects
# Effect: Supplement to item 6 - prevents the system from sending redirects (system is not a router).
# Side effects: None.
net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0

# 14. Reverse Path Filtering
# Effect: Strict protection against IP spoofing. Packet is dropped if it arrives on an interface it shouldn't have.
# ⚠️ RED MARK ⚠️
# Side effects: If you have a complex network with multiple interfaces (e.g., wired + Wi-Fi + VPN), strict mode (1) may disable internet on one of the interfaces.
# Solution: If network issues occur, try value 2 (loose mode).
# If that doesn't help - comment these lines out.
net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 1
net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = 1
net.ipv4.conf.*.rp_filter = 1

# 15. Reduce TCP timeouts
# This parameter only works for outgoing (client) connections. For incoming connections (if you were running a server), it's useless.
# Effect: Fast resource release when connections are closed.
# Side effects: In rare cases, may prematurely close "slow" connections.
net.ipv4.tcp_fin_timeout = 15
net.ipv4.tcp_tw_reuse = 1

# 16. Ignore bogus ICMP error responses
# Effect: Drops ICMP packets with invalid error codes.
# Side effects: None.
net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = 1

# ========== KERNEL HARDENING ==========

# 17. Restrict access to kernel logs and addresses
# Effect: dmesg_restrict - only root can see kernel message buffer.
#         kptr_restrict=2 - kernel pointer addresses are hidden from all, including root.
# Side effects: Makes debugging system issues harder for regular users.
kernel.dmesg_restrict = 1
kernel.kptr_restrict = 2

# 18. Full Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
# Effect: Maximum protection against memory vulnerability exploitation (buffer overflow).
# Side effects: May cause rare issues with legacy software not compiled with PIC/PIE support.
kernel.randomize_va_space = 2

# 19. Restrict ptrace (YAMA)
# Effect: Prevents processes from tracing (debugging) other processes. Protects browser memory from being read by stealers.
# ⚠️ RED MARK ⚠️
# Side effects: Breaks debuggers (gdb, strace) when attaching to another PID. Does not affect child processes (e.g., terminal debugging still works).
# Note: For regular users - safe and recommended.
kernel.yama.ptrace_scope = 2

# 20. DISABLE USER NAMESPACES
# Effect: Closes the main vector for local privilege escalation. Prevents container isolation for unprivileged users.
# ⚠️⚠️⚠️ RED MARK (HIGH COMPATIBILITY RISK) ⚠️⚠️⚠️
# Side effects:
#   - COMPLETELY breaks Flatpak/Snap applications
#   - Breaks Docker/Podman for regular users
#   - Breaks Chrome/Chromium sandbox (browser may crash or become unstable)
#   - Some modern applications may fail to launch
# Test: If browser or app store fails to start after reboot - comment these two lines out (commented by default, uncomment only if necessary).
# kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone = 0
# user.max_user_namespaces = 0

# 21. Disable eBPF for unprivileged users
# Effect: Prevents creation of eBPF programs (frequently used by rootkits and exploits).
# Side effects: Breaks monitoring tools running via eBPF (e.g., bcc-tools) if not run as root.
kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled = 1

# 22. DISABLE AUTOMATIC TERMINAL LINE DISCIPLINE LOADING
# Effect: Prevents automatic loading of line disciplines via serial ports (TTY).
#         Closes attack vector related to terminal device manipulation.
# Side effects: For typical desktops without specialized hardware — none.
#                   Does not affect standard terminals, SSH, consoles.
dev.tty.ldisc_autoload = 0

# 23. PROTECTION OF FIFO FILES IN SHARED DIRECTORIES
# Effect: Prevents creation of named pipes (FIFO) in sticky-bit directories (/tmp, /var/tmp).
#         Prevents attacks using FIFO for privilege escalation or bypassing restrictions.
# Side effects: Does not affect normal application operation, as they should not create FIFOs
#                   in public temporary directories. Completely safe for desktops.
fs.protected_fifos = 2

# 24. COMPLETE DISABLE OF SYSREQ (MAGIC KEYS)
# Effect: Disables Alt+SysRq+command combinations, which allow low-level commands
#         even when the system freezes (reboot, sync, process termination).
#         Prevents accidental or malicious system reset via physical keyboard.
# Side effects: During actual system freeze, you won't be able to use SysRq for safe
#                   reboot (reboot, sync). For home PCs — not critical, as usually
#                   the power button or unplugging is used.
kernel.sysrq = 0

# 25. STRENGTHEN BPF JIT COMPILER PROTECTION
# Effect: Enables additional checks and randomization in Berkeley Packet Filter JIT compiler.
#         Hardens exploitation of vulnerabilities in eBPF programs that can be used by rootkits.
#         Value 2 enables maximum hardening without disabling eBPF.
# Side effects: Slight overhead when compiling BPF programs.
#                   Does not affect daily system operation. Docker and modern applications
#                   continue to work normally.
net.core.bpf_jit_harden = 2


# ========== END OF CONFIG ==========
# After applying, check browser and Flatpak application operation.
# For User Namespace issues - see item 20.

        
    

        

#!/usr/sbin/nft -f

flush ruleset

table inet filter { # Opening the ruleset

    # === Adding a container for dynamic IP addresses of websites ===
    set whitelist_fqdn {
        type ipv4_addr
        flags interval
    }

    # === Adding a container for system dynamic IP addresses of websites ===
    set whitelist_fqdn_system {
        type ipv4_addr
        flags interval
    }


  
  # ============================================
  # START OF INPUT CHAIN
  # ============================================
  
  # = Main chain policy =
  chain input {
    type filter hook input priority 0;
    policy drop;

    # = Set of general rules =
    # 🌀 Allow loopback interface (internal processes)
    iif "lo" accept

    # == 🔁 Allow established and related connections ==
    ct state established,related accept
    
    # == 🔒 Proper protection against aggressive incoming traffic (anti-DDoS) ==
    # We do NOT allow traffic, we only instantly destroy what exceeds the limit.
    # If the rate exceeds 100 per second, the packet is logged and dropped right here.
    # If the rate is within limits, the packet goes further down, where a reliable default DROP awaits it.
    ip saddr 0.0.0.0/0 ct state new limit rate over 100/second burst 200 packets log prefix "🔥 BAN: too many conn " flags all drop

    # == 🛡️ Rate-limit ICMP echo requests (ping) ==
    ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request limit rate 1/second accept
    ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request log prefix "🔥 BAN: ICMP flood " flags all
    ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request drop

    # == 🚫 Block SSDP and mDNS (local broadcast protocols) ==
    ip daddr 239.255.255.250 udp dport 1900 drop   # ❌ SSDP (UPnP/device discovery)
    ip daddr 224.0.0.251 udp dport 5353 drop       # ❌ mDNS (Bonjour, Avahi)

    # == 🛑 Block NetBIOS and LLMNR (internal Windows/systemd protocols) ==
    udp dport 137 drop    # ❌ NetBIOS Name Service (Windows network names)
    udp dport 138 drop    # ❌ NetBIOS Datagram Service (LAN browsing)
    udp dport 5355 drop   # ❌ LLMNR (Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution)

    # = Set of rules for blocking IP addresses and ranges =
    
    # == 🧱 Block known botnets and proxies ==
    ip saddr {
      45.9.20.0/24,
      89.248.160.0/19,
      185.220.100.0/22,
      198.96.155.0/24,
      185.107.56.0/24,
      185.129.62.0/23
    } log prefix "🔥 BAN: known bots " flags all
    ip saddr {
      45.9.20.0/24,
      89.248.160.0/19,
      185.220.100.0/22,
      198.96.155.0/24,
      185.107.56.0/24,
      185.129.62.0/23
    } drop

    # == 🚫 Block invalid TCP flags (XMAS, NULL scan, etc.) ==
    tcp flags & (fin|syn|rst|psh|ack|urg) == 0 drop        # NULL scan
    tcp flags & (fin|psh|urg) == (fin|psh|urg) drop          # XMAS scan
    tcp flags & (fin|syn) == (fin|syn) drop                  # SYN-ACK scan
    tcp flags & (syn|rst|fin) == (syn|rst|fin) drop          # Xmas scan
    tcp flags & (syn|fin|rst|psh|ack) == (syn|rst|fin|ack) drop # Xmas scan

    # == 🚫 Block fragmented packets — often used to bypass filters ==
    ip frag-off & 0x1fff != 0 drop

    # == 🔒 Block packets with spoofed IPs (anti-spoofing) ==
    ip saddr 127.0.0.0/8 drop          # localhost
    ip saddr 10.0.0.0/8 drop           # private network
    ip saddr 172.16.0.0/12 drop        # private network
    ip saddr 192.168.0.0/16 drop       # private network
    ip saddr 169.254.0.0/16 drop       # APIPA
    ip saddr 0.0.0.0/8 drop            # invalid address
    ip saddr 224.0.0.0/4 drop          # multicast
    ip saddr 240.0.0.0/5 drop          # reserved
  }

  # ============================================
  # END OF INPUT CHAIN
  # ============================================

  
  # ============================================
  # START OF OUTPUT CHAIN
  # ============================================

  chain output {
    # = Main chain policy =
    type filter hook output priority 0;
    policy drop;
    
    # = THE VERY FIRST - critically important rules =
    
    ct state established,related accept
    oif "lo" accept

    # Drop any outgoing packets marked as invalid by conntrack
    # This ensures immediate destruction of invalid packets
    # before the remaining filtering rules are applied.
    ct state invalid log prefix "🔥 INVALID_OUT_PACKET: " drop
    
    # =======================================================================
    # 1. GENERAL PROTECTIVE SHIELD (Only rate limiting!)
    # =======================================================================
    
    # ATTENTION: There is NO accept keyword here. This rule does NOT allow packets out to the internet.
    # The "!" sign means: if the rate exceeds the limit, LOG and DROP the packet.
    # If the rate is within limits, the packet silently passes below — to your IP whitelist.
    # ATTENTION: meta l4proto { tcp, udp } and th dport cover both TCP and UDP (HTTP/3) with a single shield.
    
    # Shield A: Block excessive creation of NEW web sessions (TCP/UDP 80,443)
    meta l4proto { tcp, udp } th dport { 80, 443 } ct state new limit rate over 100/second burst 200 packets log prefix "🔥 OUT_WEB_LIMIT_BURST: " drop
    
    # Shield B: Rate-limit high-speed UDP multimedia streams (for all states)
    # Hard-cuts anomalous speed (e.g., hidden file exfiltration by malware)
    udp dport 13000-13050 meta skuid user-sl limit rate over 150/second burst 300 packets log prefix "🔥 OUT_UDP_FLOOD_DROP: " drop

    # =========================================================================
    # 🔒 SMART INSPECTION OF ESTABLISHED SESSIONS (Protection against Connection Hijacking)
    # =========================================================================
    
    # Allow established sessions ONLY if the packets within them originate from You, Your Browser, APT, or Root.
    # System ghosts (nobody, daemon) are completely exiled from here.
    ct state established,related meta skuid { user, user-sl, _flatpak, _apt, root, systemd-timesync } accept

    # ⬇️ INSTANT CUTOFF: If an unauthorized system process attempts to hijack your session
    ct state established,related log flags skuid prefix "🔥 HIJACK_ATTEMPT_DROP: " drop
    
    # =========================================================================
    # 2. DNS SERVICE
    # Strict binding only to Quad9 at IP 9.9.9.9
    # Length control, user filtering, and backup servers
    # =========================================================================

    # 2.1. For UDP, allow only short requests (<=150 bytes) and strictly from trusted users
    ip daddr { 9.9.9.9, 31.43.43.243, 31.43.43.143 } udp dport 53 meta length <= 150 meta skuid { user, user-sl, proxy, _apt, root, systemd-timesync } ct state new accept

    # 2.2. For TCP, no length limit (for heavy DNSSEC responses), but strictly check the user
    ip daddr { 9.9.9.9, 31.43.43.243, 31.43.43.143 } tcp dport 53 meta skuid { user, user-sl, proxy, _apt, root, systemd-timesync } ct state new accept

    # 2.3. All other attempts by any unauthorized services (or long UDP) — log and destroy
    ip daddr { 9.9.9.9, 31.43.43.243, 31.43.43.143 } meta l4proto { tcp, udp } th dport 53 log flags skuid prefix "🔥 OUT_BLOCK_LEAK_DNS: " drop


    # == Critically important ICMP for the network ==
    ip protocol icmp icmp type { destination-unreachable, time-exceeded, parameter-problem } accept

    # == Important ICMPv6 for IPv6 ==
    ip6 nexthdr icmpv6 icmpv6 type { 1, 2, 3, 4 } accept
    ip6 nexthdr icmpv6 icmpv6 type { 135, 136 } accept  # NS/NA
    ip6 nexthdr icmpv6 icmpv6 type { 133, 134 } accept  # RS/RA
    
    # =========================================================================
    # BLOCKING RARE PROTOCOLS
    # =========================================================================
    # All rare protocols (SCTP, DCCP, and others) are automatically blocked
    # by the policy drop. Explicit rules are not required for them.
    # =========================================================================


    # ⬇️ INSERT: Connect to the @whitelist_fqdn and @whitelist_fqdn_system list content
    
        # Traditional web traffic (TCP)
        ip daddr @whitelist_fqdn tcp dport { 80, 443 } meta skuid { user, _flatpak } ct state new accept
        
        # Modern accelerated QUIC / HTTP.3 web traffic (UDP) - SAFE
        ip daddr @whitelist_fqdn udp dport 443 meta skuid { user, _flatpak } ct state new accept

        # System services list: Debian update mirrors and other repositories
        ip daddr @whitelist_fqdn_system tcp dport { 80, 443 } meta skuid { user, _flatpak, _apt, root } ct state new accept
        
    # ⬆️ END OF INSERT
    
    
    # ⬇️ INSERT: whitelist.nft file contents are inserted here
    
        include "/etc/nftables.d/whitelist.nft"
        
    # ⬆️ END OF INSERT




  } #  The penultimate brace closes the ruleset of the output chain. Do not remove!
  
  # ============================================
  # END OF OUTPUT CHAIN
  # ============================================
  
} #  The last brace closes the entire configuration ruleset. Do not remove!


        
    

        

# /etc/nftables.d/whitelist.nft
# Whitelist of IP addresses for outbound connections
# Also applies filtering by UID

# List (for the provider and utility IPs)

# === Router web interface ===
ip daddr 192.168.0.1 tcp dport 80 meta skuid { user, _flatpak, root } ct state new accept

# =========================================================================
# === Internet service provider ===
# =========================================================================
# Provider's personal account and main website your.provider.net
# Defined using strict CIDR ranges of the autonomous system
# Opened for account top-up even during DNS failures and blocks
ip daddr {
    192.0.2.0/24,         # Location of the personal account web server
    198.51.100.0/24,      # Location of the information website
    192.0.2.0/19,         # Provider's main address pool
    198.51.100.0/20       # Subscriber routing pool
} tcp dport { 80, 443 } meta skuid { user, _flatpak, root } ct state new accept

# === ⏰ Allow system time synchronization (NTP) ===
# This rule is paranoid: UDP port 123 is open EXCLUSIVELY for this process.
# No backdoor running as root or nobody will be able to exploit this loophole.
udp dport 123 meta skuid systemd-timesync ct state new accept


# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
#  🎮 RULES BLOCK FOR USER user-sl (Local Squid Proxy Scheme)
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

# 1. Allow Squid proxy server access to the internet via HTTP/HTTPS and game ports
# This rule works under the proxy service user.
tcp dport { 80, 443, 12043, 12046, 13000-13050 } meta skuid proxy ct state new accept

# 2. Allow outgoing TCP connections from user-sl to local Squid
ip daddr 127.0.0.1 tcp dport 3128 meta skuid user-sl ct state new accept

# 3. Main game stream of Second Life simulators directly to the internet (UDP)
udp dport 13000-13050 meta skuid user-sl ct state new accept

# 4. Hard-block DIRECT web surfing for user-sl (to prevent bypassing the proxy)
# Exclude inventory ports, strictly block standard HTTP/HTTPS.
tcp dport { 80, 443 } meta skuid user-sl drop
udp dport { 80, 443 } meta skuid user-sl drop

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
#  END OF RULES BLOCK FOR USER user-sl
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════


 # === Backup DNS Quad9 ===
 ip daddr  9.9.9.0/24 udp dport 53 meta skuid { user, user-sl, proxy, _apt, root } accept

 # === Backup DNS Quad9 (149.112.0.0/16) ===
 ip daddr 149.112.0.0/16 udp dport 53 meta skuid { user, user-sl, proxy, _apt, root } accept 


        
    

        

# Official Debian web resources and forums
debian.org
www.debian.org
wiki.debian.org
forums.debian.net
www.forums.debian.net
cache.forums.debian.net

# Authorization systems, DDoS protection and captcha
recaptcha.net
www.recaptcha.net
gstatic.com
www.gstatic.com
hcaptcha.com

# Code validators
validator.w3.org

# DeepSeek
deepseek.com
www.deepseek.com
chat.deepseek.com
api.deepseek.com
deepseek.ch
fe-static.deepseek.com

# ChatGPT and DALL-E image generation
openai.com
www.openai.com
chatgpt.com
www.chatgpt.com
chat.openai.com
auth0.openai.com
oaistatic.com
oaiusercontent.com

# GitHub development platform and GitHub Pages
github.com
www.github.com
github.io
www.github.io
raw.githubusercontent.com
githubassets.com
objects.githubusercontent.com

# Flathub 
dl.flathub.org

# Global CDN hubs for public libraries 
# (Highlight.js code highlighting and Swiper carousel)
# These domains should be added to the user-specific file (domains_user.list), not to the system one. 
# These libraries are downloaded by your browser, which runs under the regular user account.
cdnjs.cloudflare.com
cdn.jsdelivr.net

# Product Hunt platform (Discovery and launches of new IT products and startups)
producthunt.com
ph-files.imgix.net

# IT community Habr (Articles, news and media content)
habr.com
www.habr.com
account.habr.com
habrastorage.org
assets.habr.com
dr.habr.com

# Wikipedia
wikipedia.org
ru.wikipedia.org
en.wikipedia.org

# Google infrastructure and services
google.com
www.google.com
accounts.google.com
www.accounts.google.com
play.google.com
www.play.google.com
googleusercontent.com
search.google.com
odc.google.com
gstatic.com
fonts.googleapis.com
fonts.gstatic.com
ajax.googleapis.com
apis.google.com

# DuckDuckGo infrastructure and services
duckduckgo.com
external-content.duckduckgo.com

# Public CDN for Bootstrap styles and icons (Required for the design of legacy websites)
maxcdn.bootstrapcdn.com

# Bunny Fonts used for secure and fast delivery of web fonts
fonts.bunny.net

# Social networks, diaries and messengers
facebook.com
www.facebook.com
dreamwidth.org
www.dreamwidth.org
embedded.dreamwidth.net 
t.me
tx.me
telegram.org

# Bing search engine and Microsoft services
bing.com
www.bing.com
microsoft.com
s-microsoft.com

# Secure Proton services (Mail, Drive, VPN)
proton.me
www.proton.me
mail.proton.me
account.proton.me
api.proton.me
drive.proton.me
protonmail.com
zrh-storage.proton.me
protonvpn.com
api.protonvpn.ch

# Media and photo hosting
imgbb.com
ibb.co
catbox.moe


        
    

        

# Official Debian infrastructure and update mirrors
debian.org
deb.debian.org
ftp.debian.org
security.debian.org
incoming.debian.org
snapshot.debian.org

# Servers for apt-listbugs (package bug checking)
bugs.debian.org

# OS and software update repositories
repo.librewolf.net
repo.protonvpn.com

# openSUSE infrastructure (Zeek repository)
opensuse.org
download.opensuse.org
mirrorcache-eu.opensuse.org


        
    

        

#!/bin/bash

# Paths to utilities
DIG="/usr/bin/dig"
NFT="/usr/sbin/nft"

# Paths to domain files
USER_DOMAINS="/etc/nftables.d/nftables.domains"
SYSTEM_DOMAINS="/etc/nftables.d/nftables.domains-system"

# Temporary files for collecting subnets
TMP_USER=$(mktemp)
TMP_SYSTEM=$(mktemp)

# Hard pause of 15 seconds during automatic system boot via cron
if [ "$1" != "manual" ]; then
    sleep 15
fi

# =====================================================================
# BLOCK 1: USER LIST (Social networks, media, banks)
# =====================================================================
if [ -f "$USER_DOMAINS" ]; then
    while read -r domain; do
        [[ -z "$domain" || "$domain" =~ ^# ]] && continue

        ips=$($DIG +short "$domain" 2>/dev/null | grep -E '^[0-9.]+$')
        for ip in $ips; do
            if [[ "$domain" =~ "telegram" || "$domain" == "t.me" || "$domain" =~ "facebook" || "$domain" =~ "wixmp" || "$domain" =~ "bing" || "$domain" =~ "microsoft" ]]; then
                subnet=$(echo "$ip" | cut -d'.' -f1-2)".0.0/16"
            else
                subnet=$(echo "$ip" | cut -d'.' -f1-3)".0/24"
            fi
            echo "$subnet" >> "$TMP_USER"
        done
    done < "$USER_DOMAINS"

    if [ -s "$TMP_USER" ]; then
        sort -u "$TMP_USER" -o "$TMP_USER"
        $NFT flush set inet filter whitelist_fqdn
        while read -r sub; do
            $NFT add element inet filter whitelist_fqdn { "$sub" }
        done < "$TMP_USER"
    fi
fi

# =====================================================================
# BLOCK 2: SYSTEM LIST (APT update repositories)
# =====================================================================
if [ -f "$SYSTEM_DOMAINS" ]; then
    while read -r domain; do
        [[ -z "$domain" || "$domain" =~ ^# ]] && continue

        ips=$($DIG +short "$domain" 2>/dev/null | grep -E '^[0-9.]+$')
        for ip in $ips; do
            # For system repositories, always use strict /24 mask for security
            subnet=$(echo "$ip" | cut -d'.' -f1-3)".0/24"
            echo "$subnet" >> "$TMP_SYSTEM"
        done
    done < "$SYSTEM_DOMAINS"

    if [ -s "$TMP_SYSTEM" ]; then
        sort -u "$TMP_SYSTEM" -o "$TMP_SYSTEM"
        $NFT flush set inet filter whitelist_fqdn_system
        while read -r sub; do
            $NFT add element inet filter whitelist_fqdn_system { "$sub" }
        done < "$TMP_SYSTEM"
    fi
fi

# Cleanup temporary files
rm "$TMP_USER" "$TMP_SYSTEM"


        
    

        
# Enter root's cron:
sudo crontab -e

# Add the following line to the end of the file:
# script for updating the list of allowed IP ranges 
# for nftables output chain
# update every 10 minutes. 
# on powerful machines you can do it more frequently
*/10 * * * * /usr/local/bin/update_fqdn.sh
        
    

        
if [[ "$domain" =~ "telegram" || "$domain" == "t.me" || "$domain" =~ "facebook" || "$domain" =~ "google" ]]; then
    subnet=$(echo "$ip" | cut -d'.' -f1-2)".0.0/16"
else
    subnet=$(echo "$ip" | cut -d'.' -f1-3)".0/24"
fi
        
    

        
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# 🖥️ SQUID PROXY MAIN CONFIGURATION (Debian 13 / user-sl)
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

# Port on which the proxy will listen (strictly on the local interface)
http_port 127.0.0.1:3128

# Standard basic ACLs for network port security
acl Safe_ports port 80          # Standard HTTP
acl Safe_ports port 443         # Standard HTTPS (SSL)
acl Safe_ports port 12043       # HTTP for Second Life inventory
acl Safe_ports port 12046       # HTTPS for Second Life inventory
acl Safe_ports port 13000-13050 # Additional game TCP traffic SL

# CRITICALLY IMPORTANT: Allow CONNECT method (HTTPS tunnel) on game ports
acl SSL_ports port 443
acl SSL_ports port 12043        # FIXED: Allow Capabilities tunnels of game simulators
acl SSL_ports port 12046
acl SSL_ports port 13000-13050
acl CONNECT method CONNECT

# Hard-block requests to non-standard ports
http_access deny !Safe_ports
# Block CONNECT only if the port is NOT in the SSL_ports list
http_access deny CONNECT !SSL_ports

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# 🛡️ DOMAIN WHITELIST FILTERING
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

# Define the source: domain whitelist from our renamed external file
acl squid_domains_whitelist dstdomain "/etc/squid/squid_domains_whitelist.txt"

# Allow access only to these domains
http_access allow squid_domains_whitelist

# Hard-block everything else
http_access deny all

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
#  CONFIDENTIALITY AND LOGGING
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

# Disable X-Forwarded-For headers for privacy
via on
forwarded_for off

# Disable all logging to improve performance and minimize disk I/O
access_log none
cache_log /dev/null
cache_store_log none
logfile_rotate 0

# Disable caching entirely:
# Squid operates solely as a TCP traffic filter in this configuration,
# therefore caching is not needed
cache deny all

# Accelerate shutdown process to avoid system conflicts during graceful termination
shutdown_lifetime 5 seconds

        
    

        
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# 📱 GROUP 1: MESSENGER RAKUTEN VIBER
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
.viber.com                 # Main domain, authorization, chats, sticker packs
.viberout.com              # Telephony and Viber Out calls to mobile numbers

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# 🎮 GROUP 2: FIRESTORM VIEWER / SECOND LIFE & VIVOX VOICE
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
.lindenlab.com             # Game developers, infrastructure, avatar loading
.secondlife.com            # Game site, authorization, inventory, marketplace
.secondlife.io             # Auxiliary game services and inventory
.vivox.com                 # Game voice engine (Vivox Voice server, voice in SL)
.firestormviewer.org       # Official viewer site, auto-updates, reference materials
.secondlife.net            # Old but still used for Capabilities internal game domain

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# 📺 GROUP 3: INFRASTRUCTURE GOOGLE (YouTube, Search, Gmail, API, Gemini)
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
.google.com                # Base domain of search engine and Google accounts
.youtube.com               # Main domain of YouTube video hosting
.youtu.be                  # Short video sharing links YouTube
.youtube-nocookie.com      # Embedded videos on third-party sites (without cookies)
.googlevideo.com           # Video stream delivery servers (YouTube streaming)
.ytimg.com                 # YouTube static servers (thumbnails, icons, avatars)
.googleusercontent.com     # User content (photos, Google Drive files)
.gstatic.com               # Static Google components (fonts, scripts, styles)
.googleapis.com            # Google API (authorization, maps, libraries, Gemini API)

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# ☁️ GROUP 4: AMAZON WEB SERVICES & CLOUDFRONT CDN
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
.amazonaws.com             # General AWS infrastructure domain (EC2/S3/Backends)
.cloudfront.net            # Amazon content delivery network (static hosting and API)

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# 🌐 GROUP 5: LARGEST CDN BACKBONES (Cloudflare & Akamai Extended)
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
.cloudflare.com            # Protection and caching of Second Life and Viber web resources
.akamai.net                # Base domain of Akamai Technologies distributed network
.akamaihd.net              # Akamai backbone CDN (loading heavy SL textures)
.akamaized.net             # Additional Akamai CDN mirrors for in-game graphics

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# 🔒 GROUP 6: AUTHORIZATION SYSTEMS, DDoS PROTECTION AND CAPTCHA
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
.recaptcha.net             # Google bot protection service reCAPTCHA
.hcaptcha.com              # Alternative captcha and spam protection system
.gstatic.com

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# 🤖 GROUP 7: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (DEEPSEEK AI)
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
.deepseek.com              # Main portal, web interface chat and DeepSeek API
.deepseek.ch               # Additional mirrors and Swiss domains of DeepSeek

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# 🛡️ GROUP 8: AMAZON DYNAMIC PROTECTION SERVICES (AWS WAF BOT CONTROL)
# Covers any random subdomains of AWS security tokens and verification checks
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
.edge.sdk.awswaf.com       # AWS WAF JS SDK integration (covers we34qqa43.edge.sdk.awswaf.com)
.token.awswaf.com          # Amazon protection token generation (covers eu-west-1.token.awswaf.com)

        
    

        
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import subprocess
import time
import os

# Status check interval (seconds)
CHECK_INTERVAL = 2
# Repeat notification interval on failure (seconds)
NOTIFY_INTERVAL = 300  # 5 minutes
# Notification display duration (milliseconds)
NOTIFY_TIMEOUT = 4500  # 4.5 seconds

def check_apparmor():
    """Check AppArmor status (without sudo)"""
    try:
        # Check if the module is loaded
        if not os.path.exists('/sys/module/apparmor/parameters/enabled'):
            return False
        with open('/sys/module/apparmor/parameters/enabled', 'r') as f:
            if f.read().strip() != 'Y':
                return False

        # Check service activity via systemctl
        result = subprocess.run(
            ['systemctl', 'is-active', 'apparmor'],
            capture_output=True,
            text=True
        )
        if result.returncode == 0 and result.stdout.strip() == 'active':
            return True

        # If systemctl fails, try aa-status
        if os.path.exists('/usr/sbin/aa-status'):
            result = subprocess.run(
                ['/usr/sbin/aa-status'],
                capture_output=True,
                text=True
            )
            if result.returncode == 0 and 'apparmor module is loaded' in result.stdout:
                return True
        return False
    except Exception:
        return False

def check_nftables():
    """Check nftables status"""
    try:
        result = subprocess.run(
            ['systemctl', 'is-active', 'nftables'],
            capture_output=True,
            text=True
        )
        return result.returncode == 0 and result.stdout.strip() == 'active'
    except Exception:
        return False

def send_notification(message):
    """Send system notification via notify-send"""
    try:
        subprocess.run(
            ['notify-send', '-t', str(NOTIFY_TIMEOUT), '⚠️ Security Alert', message],
            check=True
        )
    except Exception as e:
        print(f"Failed to send notification: {e}")

def main():
    last_notify_time = 0
    last_state = (True, True)  # (apparmor, nftables)
    first_failure_detected = False

    print("Monitoring script started. Checking status every 2 seconds...")

    while True:
        apparmor_ok = check_apparmor()
        nftables_ok = check_nftables()

        # Determine current state
        current_state = (apparmor_ok, nftables_ok)

        # If state has changed, reset the last notification timer
        if current_state != last_state:
            last_state = current_state
            last_notify_time = 0
            first_failure_detected = False

        # Check if there is a failure
        if not (apparmor_ok and nftables_ok):
            now = time.time()
            # Send notification if enough time has passed since the previous one
            if now - last_notify_time >= NOTIFY_INTERVAL or not first_failure_detected:
                # Format the message
                if not apparmor_ok and not nftables_ok:
                    message = "nftables and AppArmor DISABLE"
                elif not nftables_ok:
                    message = "nftables DISABLE"
                else:
                    message = "AppArmor DISABLE"

                send_notification(message)
                last_notify_time = now
                first_failure_detected = True

        # Wait for the next check cycle
        time.sleep(CHECK_INTERVAL)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()